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Current History

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MAY, 1974

MEXICO, 1974

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Current History

MAY, 1974

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In the eight articles that follow, we are focusing on Mexico, our neighbor to the south. Our introductory article points out that: "... it is impossible to understand Mexico except as a country that is developing. ..."

Mexico's Growing Pains

BY MARTIN C. NEEDLER

Director of the Division of Inter-American Affairs, University of New Mexico

IT MAY BE, as some observers have argued, that many countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa can be called "developing" only by courtesy. If any country deserves to be called "developing," however, Mexico is the one. In fact, it is impossible to understand Mexico except as a country that is developing, that is, changing steadily in the direction of higher per capita income, more modern attitudes, and a greater degree of national integration.

Development in this sense is shown in a variety of indicators: the spectacular annual increases of between 7 and 10 percent in gross national product over the last 15 or 20 years; the steady drop in the percentage of illiterates until today illiterates make up less than a quarter of the population; the movement to the cities, which has left more than half of all Mexicans urban, at least by census definition.

Indicators of development also abound in the political system. Thus, the percentage of the population voting in presidential elections has steadily risen: Venustiano Carranza was elected in 1917 with 5.3 percent of the national population casting ballots; 27.6 percent of the population voted in the election that made Luis Echeverría Alvarez President in 1970. The influence of the military in politics has steadily decreased, with generals disappearing in sequence from the presidency, the ministries in the Cabinet not concerned with the armed forces, and the governorships.

But development has not been smooth and painless. On the contrary, Mexico has encountered severe problems—social, political, and economic—and indeed the difficulties the country is passing through at present could fairly be termed a crisis. It would be mistaken, however, to tell the story of Mexico only in terms of the problems, the difficulties, and the

costs. The achievements are real; they are cumulative; and on most accountings they outweigh the costs of the process.

THE CURRENT SHIFT IN DIRECTION

Although the country faces major social problems associated with development, like the formidable atmospheric pollution of Mexico City, the current crisis centers around questions of economic and political policy. This crisis focuses especially on the current President, Luis Echeverría, now more than halfway through his term of office, which extends from late 1970 to late 1976. Echeverría's orientation is very explicitly to the left, and the President takes every opportunity to express this symbolically. His relations with Chilean President Salvador Allende were very warm, and Mexico made every effort to bring out refugees and give them asylum after Allende's assassination (or suicide) and the overthrow of his government. Most recently, in January, 1974, Echeverría gave a hero's burial to the great muralist, David Alfaro Siqueiros, a long-time Communist militant (although he was expelled from the party in 1971). Echeverría has clearly tried to model himself on the great Lázaro Cárdenas, although most Mexicans have difficulty identifying the bespectacled career bureaucrat with the charismatic revolutionary general.

In his desire to move Mexico to the left, Echeverría has tried to reorient economic policy away from emphasis on maximum growth by any means; he has been willing to accept a reduced rate of growth in the interest of greater equality in income distribution and lessened dependence on foreign capital. Under the policies of his predecessors, Mexico's foreign indebtedness had grown, and the burden of debt service and repatriation of profits and dividends had begun to

weigh heavily on the balance of payments. Moreover, the government's pro-business policies had meant that most of the increase in national income went to the growing middle class. Unemployment rose as young people joined the urban labor force, and the government had paid little attention to the needs of the rural poor.

Echeverría's reorientation of policy was thus overdue. It did result in a decline in the growth rate initially, although the rate for 1973 was back above seven percent. Of course, world inflation and the higher costs of fuel and imported foodstuffs doubtless mean that the rate of growth during the 1970's will probably stay below the growth rate of the previous decade.

Echeverría has also been trying to open up the Mexican political system, dominated by the all-powerful government party, the PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*). Revolutionary and democratic in its formal ideology, the system on its dark side always held elements of corruption, authoritarianism, and repression.

President Echeverría's attempt to create "Mexicanism with a human face" has met with formidable opposition from entrenched elements within the ruling party, characterized by sabotage of the President's directives and the use of violence against dissenting students. Nevertheless, the *aggiornamento* continues. With a purge of many old-line politicians, Echeverría has brought young liberals and left-wing intellectuals into responsible positions. The most striking illustration of this trend was the appointment of Enrique González Pedrero (a professor of political science who had written for the defunct left-wing journal *Política*) as secretary-general of the PRI.

The opening up of the political system included a conscious effort by Echeverría to speak frankly and openly about the country's problems, getting away from the stilted rhetoric with which his predecessors had always assured the country that everything was all right. This new openness included a forthright advocacy of the need for birth control to bring down the rate of population increase from its annual 3 to 3½ percent—an amusing irony in that Echeverría, who has eight children, advocates birth control while the cardinal, who has none, opposes it.

From a developmental perspective, the change of direction that Echeverría is trying to impose on Mexico is not simply the swing of the pendulum with which all Mexican Presidents move away from the excesses of their predecessors' policies. (Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, 1964–1970, was right-wing in his economic policies and repressive in his politics.) Rather, Echeverría is attempting a fundamental shift as the country's social and cultural circumstances develop out of the stage in which a passive and ignorant population could be assumed.

MEXICO AS MODEL

The distinctive Mexican political and economic systems had long been thought to be *sui generis*. The complex and apparently self-contradictory political system, in which a dominant single party held open elections, tolerated press criticism, encouraged opposition parties, prohibited presidential reelection, and attempted to expand its membership by satisfying mass demands, stood in sharp contrast to the practices of single-party regimes as these were known elsewhere. The economic system also formed a paradoxical mélange of nationalism, government enterprise, and openness to foreign investment. To be sure, there have always been cases of Mexican influence elsewhere, and even the imitation of some Mexican practices. But these had always seemed isolated and even bizarre. Augusto César Sandino, the great Nicaraguan guerrilla leader, was influenced by the Mexican revolution, and it is possible that Peruvian politician Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre absorbed the ideas of the revolution during his Mexican exile. Jacques Soustelle is supposed to have said that he was influenced, in his party organizational work for French President and General Charles de Gaulle, by his observation of the PRI while working as an archaeologist in Mexico. Governments in El Salvador during the 1950's and 1960's have thought in terms of the Mexican model, and General René Barrientos Ortuño of Bolivia once explicitly said that the Bolivians should try to learn from Mexico.

But it is in the realm of economic policy that Mexico has proved to be the model for Latin America. The Mexican economic formula is based on government ownership of key utilities and natural resource extraction operations; openness to foreign investment in the rest of the economy (but preferably in association with domestic capital); neither rigid a priori planning nor laissez-faire, but a system of government guidance of the private sector through licensing, subsidies, and ad hoc intervention. These are the norms of economic policy emerging throughout Latin America, in the Andean common market countries, in Panama under Omar Torrijos Herrera, and in Argentina under Juan Perón. It is to be expected

(Continued on page 231)

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"Yet myth or fact, the revolution persists, a witness to its strength, and a testimony to the flexibility of the revolutionary ideology. In that flexibility lies the key to the past and the promise for the future."

The Mexican Revolution: A Retrospective View

BY ROBERT M. LEVINE

Associate Professor of History, State University of New York at Stony Brook

THE INGENUOUS DECISION to perpetuate the Mexican revolution as the embodiment of moral and political authority in Mexican life has generated a continuing debate on the nature and significance of its place in history, a debate which, almost by definition, must last until the revolution itself is declared extinct by its guardians. The Mexican revolution, a series of separate but interconnected events, erupted in 1910, a year before Sun Yat-sen's accession to the presidency of the revolutionary Provisional Chinese Republic and seven years before the final success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Truly, it is a landmark in the history of the Western hemisphere.

The initial phase of the Mexican revolution spans the years between 1910 and 1917, during which time the civilian-based movement for political reform led by Francisco I. Madero yielded to violence, the abdication of dictator Porfirio Díaz in May, 1911, Madero's own death by assassination, and a bloody civil war. The violent sub-phase of the revolution, from 1913 to 1917, was marked by competing revolutionary and counterrevolutionary armies and changing allegiances; it concluded with the convocation of a constituent assembly at Querétaro in December, 1916, and the promulgation of an unprecedented and eloquent document, the Mexican constitution of 1917. The constitution institutionalized the revolutionary cause and committed Mexico to vigilance and enforced change based on an amalgam of ideas rooted in nationalism, Roman and Spanish law, and the call for social justice.

The Querétaro convention confirmed Venustiano Carranza, its mentor and Mexico's de facto caudillo since August, 1915, as the nation's first constitutional President. Carranza, the patriarchal governor of the

state of Coahuila and a former partisan of Díaz, attempted to impose a hand-picked would-be puppet as his successor. The effort failed, leading to Carranza's death: the train on which he was attempting to flee (with a portion of the national treasury) was derailed and the ex-chief was hunted down in the hills and shot. Carranza was succeeded by Álvaro Obregón, a fellow northerner, a military hero, and the author of the organizational form into which the country's political system was molded after 1920. His successor, Plutarco Calles, brought events full circle by deliberately slowing the pace of social reform that Obregón had initiated and by allowing the revolutionary apparatus to be infiltrated by corrupt generals, labor leaders, bureaucrats, and related hangers-on. Unlike Carranza, Calles succeeded in naming a puppet-heir. Like the Soviet Union in the days of the post-war New Economic Policy, Mexico seemed to have abandoned her revolutionary pretense, although some gains did occur, mostly in the areas of public health and primary education, in an atmosphere of repression, Church-baiting, and venality.

The presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), a Tarascan Indian who had fought first with the revolutionaries Francisco (Pancho) Villa and Emiliano Zapata, and later against them, unexpectedly revived the revolution, casting Calles aside and taking an active policy of reform in compliance with the mandate of the 1917 constitution. Cárdenas dramatically asserted Mexico's economic independence by nationalizing foreign-owned petroleum facilities, railroads, and land, a calculated risk that precipitated economic reprisals and led to a heroic effort to maintain oil production singlehandedly. This effort produced a moral victory at a costly economic price.

After Cárdenas's six-year term, the revolution entered a fourth, quiescent phase, with "harmony and balance" substituted as the motto of the revolutionary government for the "class struggle" of the Cárdenas years.¹ Under the succeeding presidencies of Manuel

¹ Howard F. Cline, "Mexico: A Matured Latin American Revolution, 1910-1960," in Stanley R. Ross, ed., *Is the Mexican Revolution Dead?* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 64.

Ávila Camacho, Miguel Alemán, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Adolfo López Mateos, and Gustavo Díaz Ordaz—each limited to a single term under the constitution—the present form of the institutionalized revolution took shape. Supporters of the government claim that since 1940 the revolution has matured, achieving balance among competing interest groups (business, industry, labor, agriculture, foreign investors), marked by steady urbanization and economic development. Critics believe that the post-1940 revolution has ground to a halt, its corpus of revolutionary slogans a mockery for a façade of conservatism under which Mexico has been reopened to foreign exploitation.

The uniqueness of the Mexican revolution lies in the fact that virtually all Mexicans, however bitterly divided over its present and future course, publicly defer to the revolution's ideology and swear allegiance to its stated goals. Even the small opposition party, the *Partido Auténtico de la Revolución*, feels the need to call itself the "authentic" party of the revolution; to be, as historian Daniel Cósío Villegas points out, "more *prista* than the PRI," the official party of the revolution and the custodian of the Mexican government.² This is not to say that every group in Mexican society accepts the revolution: it is rejected by the tiny radical cadres that survive precariously on the political fringe. One of these groups is the National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACRN), one of several guerrilla bands operating across Mexico since at least 1968, whose clashes with authorities have been largely ignored by the domestic and foreign press save for occasional dispatches by the wire services.³

In any case, the Mexican revolution pervades the consciousness of most if not all of Mexico's citizens, in much the same way that lip-service is paid in the United States to the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Madero's original slogan, "effective suffrage, no reelection," is embodied in the PRI's continued endorsement of formal representative political democracy, a tradition, as Howard Cline reminds us, that was present in Mexico a century before the revolution and that was mocked under the long Díaz dictatorship (1876–1911). To outside observers (who wanted to see stability in Mexico), however, this period seemed to reflect placid and admirable political

stability up to the very last days of the old order.⁴

In the sphere of religion, the revolution has been characterized by deep-rooted hostility between the state and the Church, a legacy dating back to the Mexican Church's efforts since the early nineteenth century (and as late as the 1930's) to play an active counter-revolutionary role. Since the 1940's, however, the anticlerical posture of the Mexican government has softened, although the regime openly supported the Republic during the Spanish Civil War, took in thousands of republican refugees, and remains the only predominately Catholic country in the world without diplomatic ties with the Vatican. President Luis Echeverría recently raised a storm of protest, even within the PRI, by announcing a forthcoming audience with the Pope, an act viewed within the context of the revolution as a gesture of extreme significance.⁵

Other currents that have become absorbed by the Mexican revolution include the juridical view of the state as the active (and exclusive) agent of the collective public interest, a thread of xenophobia that persists despite Mexico's increasing reliance on tourism as a major pillar of her economy, and the oft-cited commitment to the goal of national and social integration through official initiative. Still further strands of revolutionary ideology include racial unity, liberalism, intellectual freedom, a deemphasized military sector, and the crystalization of Mexico's cultural identity despite the impact of technological modernization.

The government, mostly through its Ministry of Education, has earnestly carried its revolutionary message to the people through devices ranging from the revolutionary murals of Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siqueiros, and José Clemente Orozco to crude attempts at revolution-inspired theater and poetry and wide dissemination of patriotic literature aimed particularly at the young. To be sure, nationalistic consciousness did not originate in the events of 1910–1917. Rather, it can be traced to the struggle for independence, a conflict with overtones of race warfare between the Indians and mestizos led by Miguel Hidalgo y Costillo and José María Morelos and the Caucasian *creoles* and *peninsulares* ultimately led by the ambitious Agustín Iturbide. Despite the sorry Santa Ana interlude, it revived during the period of the Reform, when Benito Pablo Juárez (President of Mexico from 1853 to 1863 and from 1867 to 1872), achieved victory over Maximilian and French intervention in his second term, despite the deep divisions which rent Mexican society.

Mexico's revolutionary novel, embodied in the poignant writing of Mariano Azuela (a trained physician and local *jefe político* who, as a maderista, became a fugitive from the counterrevolutionary forces after Madero's death) followed the nineteenth century tradition of Ignacio A. Altamarino, who declared

² Daniel Cósío Villegas, *El sistema político mexicano: las posibilidades de cambio* (Mexico City: Joaquín Mortiz, 1973), p. 68.

³ See, for example, *The New York Times*, Feb. 7, 1974, p. 27; North American Congress on Latin America, "The Mexican Struggle," vol. 6, no. 3, March, 1972, esp. pp. 2–10.

⁴ For discussion of the *Porfiriato*, see Anthony Bryan, "The Politics of the Porfiriato: A Research Review," Indiana University: Latin American Studies Program, 1973; Daniel Cósío Villegas, ed., *Historia moderna de México* (Mexico City: El Colegio), vols. 4–7, 1957–1965.

⁵ *Latin America* (London), vol. 8, no. 5, February 1, 1974, p. 33.

that "the novel is called to open the way to the poorer classes so that they may arrive at the height of this privileged circle and be blended with it."⁶ Azuela's works expressed his bitter disillusionment as reality superimposed itself over revolutionary ideals and human goals. Other authors popularized the exploits of the revolutionary heroes—men like Villa, Zapata, and Carranza, who in death became larger than in life. In the 1930's, a group of novelists headed by Gregorio López Fuentes revealed the barriers between Indian and Mexican society, stimulating renewed interest in Mexico's indigenous heritage and leading intellectuals to ponder the nature of "lo mexicano," the essence of Mexicanness.⁷

Since the revolution, the government has itself provided the vehicle for the popularization of revolutionary ideology. Textbooks inform school children of Mexico's "extraordinary valor" and her "heroic opposition" to invaders from the United States in the nineteenth century. Scores of popular magazines, comic books, anthems, inexpensive biographies and historical novels have saturated the literate citizenry with the revolution's message. The Ministry of Education publishes thousands of inexpensive copies of nationalistic tracts, exalting civic loyalty and reminding Mexicans of their obligations to the revolution.⁸ The campaign is cheerful and seemingly effective. To its critics, the assault of government-subsidized culture threatens to smother creative expression, but few can legitimately fault the achievements of the revolutionary painters or composers like Carlos Chavez who have extensively used indigenous themes. Today, many Latin American governments imitate or sponsor parallel efforts to raise mass political consciousness within official frameworks. The most obvious example is Cuba, although the practice is followed in Peru, Chile under Salvador Allende Gossens (and after Allende as well), and Brazil, where highly sophisti-

cated audio-visual methods and graphics promote civil awareness of that government's "permanent" (and heavily authoritarian) revolution of 1964.

Although few Mexicans have publicly questioned the broadly stated goals of the revolution, debate continues to rage over the impact of the revolutionary programs that have been implemented since 1917. Peter Calvert observes, "there is no general agreement on what social revolution is, but most concur that Mexico has had one and the majority of American states have not."⁹ Yet some deny firmly that meaningful change has taken place. To some extent, it has become as ritualistic in Mexico for critics to lament the revolution's failures as for defenders to extoll its virtues. But the arguments are genuine and the issues real. Even the leaders of the "mortician school" of Mexican revolutionary analysis admit that in Mexico, the existence of polemics is an inescapable fact.¹⁰

The difficulty of evaluating the Mexican revolution stems in part from the fact that its ideology contains an amalgam of often conflicting philosophical positions; the 1917 constitution represents a coalition of proposals and compromises rather than the ascendancy of a single doctrine.¹¹ Writings on the Mexican revolution have embraced a plethora of viewpoints—those close to the events often so partisan that their source must be identified as to orientation (Zapatista, Huertista, Villista . . .), those removed from events sometimes guilty of eristic argumentation or plain wishful thinking.¹² Marxist scholars, represented by Jesús Silva Herzog, have devoted major attention to the problems of the revolution, as have critics from the right.¹³ Literally hundreds of histories, memoirs, diaries, and accounts in bewildering diversity have appeared since the first days of the revolution, some carefully documented, others wildly partisan and hopelessly panegyric.

PROMISE AND REALITY

The Mexican revolution, then, is not easily summarized or synthesized, even in retrospect. To some degree, however, it may be judged according to the relative success or failure of its principal goals. Foremost among them are agrarian reform, the rallying cry for the rural poor, and social change, the critical necessity for a nation emerging from an underdeveloped and highly traditional past.

The demand for redistribution of land was the underlying motive of the Zapatista phase of the revolution, the single issue responsible for mass mobilization throughout Mexico's rural interior. The struggle capped an exhausting historical drama in which Indian land, held for centuries in communal fashion under the *ejido* system, was taken by the Spanish conquerors and transferred into haciendas, estates whose mortgages passed with increasing frequency into the

⁶ Cited by Frederick C. Turner, *The Dynamics of Mexican Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), p. 258.

⁷ See Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–68; John Leddy Phelan, "Mexico y lo mexicano," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 36, no. 3, August, 1956.

⁸ Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 270–71. See, for example, Francisco Vargas Ruiz, *Yo soy mexicano: Lo que todo ciudadano debe saber*, 3rd ed. (Mexico City: Enrique Sáinz Editores S.A., 1964).

⁹ Peter Calvert, "The Mexican Revolution: Theory or Fact," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1, May, 1969, p. 51.

¹⁰ Pablo González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico* (London: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1970), p. 156.

¹¹ Calvert, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹² See, for example, Francis McCullagh, *Red Mexico: A Reign of Terror in America* (New York: Louis Carrier, 1928); Francis C. Kelley, *Blood-drenched Altars* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1935).

¹³ See Jesús Silva Herzog, *Breve Historia de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1964), 2 vols; Calvert, "Theory or Fact?" pp. 54–55.

hands of the Church before and immediately after the achievement of Mexican independence. Juárez' Reform Laws of 1856-1857 forced the Church to divest itself of at least \$100-million worth of agricultural land; about 40,000 rural properties changed title under the new (and hated) legislation, a consequence of the Reform government's effort to return agricultural land to profitable use and to establish a viable rural middle class. As a by-product of the Reform laws, ejido lands were declared illegal as well. Throughout Mexico, land became readily available and became a marketable commodity. In time, the theory behind the new policy proved hollow: inexorably, the rich alienated increasing amounts of land for themselves, and the poor, unable to secure agricultural credit, saw their own lands put on the block for auction and themselves reduced to sharecroppers or agricultural laborers.

Under Díaz, hacendados acquired vast holdings that amounted to roughly one-fifth of the entire Republic of Mexico.¹⁴ In 1889, 29 corporations owned among them 68 million acres. The powerful, impersonal hacienda replaced the Indian village as the prevailing rural institution. By 1910, 54 percent of Mexico's 5 million acres of national territory was held by large estates, another 20 percent by marginal small holders, 10 percent by the state, 10 percent was non-arable, and only the remaining 6 percent was held communally by surviving ejidos.¹⁵ Madero's revolutionary Plan of San Luis Potosí offered vague promises for land reform, but he did not advocate specific or sweeping measures. The plan stimulated legislative proposals for gradual reform, but Madero's death threw the government into turmoil; Victoriano Huerta (President from 1913 to 1914) promised no swifter solutions. Into the vacuum swept Zapata's Plan of Ayala, demanding the return of all ejido land and the nationalization of haciendas. The plan, issued in November, 1911, stated:

Be it known: that the lands, woods and waters which have been usurped by hacendados, Científicos [followers of Díaz], or caciques, through tyranny and venal justice, will be restored immediately to the pueblos or citizens who have the corresponding titles to such properties, of which they were despoiled through the bad faith of our oppressors. They shall maintain such possession at all costs through force of arms.¹⁶

But Zapata, in charge of untrained and poorly

armed Indian troops who returned to their villages after battle, could only fight defensively; his army was depleted from 70,000 men and women in 1915 to 10,000 four years later. In 1915, Carranza, who had broken with Villa and Zapata, issued a decree that patronizingly authorized Indians to take land subject to later presidential approval on the grounds that "because of their backwardness, the Indians had not adapted themselves to private ownership, [thus] their claim to communal ownership had to be acknowledged for the time being."¹⁷ Even so, Carranza repealed the decree 20 months later.

But the impetus of the Zapatista revolt led the Querétaro Convention to draft the constitution's famous Article 27, giving the state the right to expropriate land without prior compensation under the principle that land belongs to the nation as a whole and may be reclaimed at any time in the public interest. As constitutional President, Carranza set out to implement the new policy, but he concentrated almost exclusively on uncultivated land, held mostly by foreigners, while opponents of the law dragged their cases through the courts. Carranza refused to dismember large haciendas or restore the ejidos. His successor, Álvaro Obregón, distributed to ejidos 3 million acres, only about one percent of the land subject to expropriation. Only under Lázaro Cárdenas did the promised agrarian reform begin in earnest: he oversaw the distribution of 44 million acres, more than double the total acreage distributed by his predecessors. Yet by the 1930's, the ejido system could not compete with the more technological modern systems of agricultural production. Ironically, the return of ejido land under Cárdenas proved in many cases short lived: many Indians were forced to sell their shares to outsiders and again found themselves reduced to peonage. The Ministry of Agriculture encouraged large-scale agricultural collectivization in the plantation regions of southern Mexico, but its results were mixed. The revolution's land reform stopped short of its true promise; for many its legacy merely substituted *minifundia* (small holdings) and debt peonage for *latifundia* (large estates) and rural wage labor.

The tempo of land redistribution slowed after Cárdenas, when the program became a victim of the post-1940 emphasis on urban industrialization. Embittered, Cárdenas himself turned to the left in his later years, founding a pro-Cuban political faction in the early 1960's, and thereby feeding ammunition to those who had always regarded him as excessively radical.¹⁸ Manuel Ávila Camacho, Cárdenas's successor in the presidency, stripped the ejido of some of the legal rights it had previously been awarded, leaving rural Mexicans even more at the economic mercy of their former patrons. On the government level, the tendency of the revolution to bureaucratization doomed another

¹⁴ Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 15-16.

¹⁵ Moisés González Navarro, "Mexico: The Lop-sided Revolution," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 206-07.

¹⁶ See Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁷ Navarro, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

¹⁸ Ronald H. Chilcote, ed., *Revolution and Structural Change in Latin America: A Bibliography on Ideology, Development, and the Radical Left* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970), vol. 2, p. 221.

of Cárdenas's initiatives: his Confederación Nacional Campesina, established to bring the peasantry into the PRI apparatus, soon became so enmeshed in red tape that local peasant leaders by-passed it in appealing for relief in times of drought or other troubles.

The balance sheet on the revolution's rural accomplishments remains mixed, to be sure. It is true, as Rodolfo Stavenhagen notes in an otherwise critical essay, that: "agrarian reform is surely the main cause of the broad economic and social changes that have occurred in Mexico during this century."¹⁹ But James W. Wilkie, in his recent, controversial examination of Mexican federal expenditure and social change since 1910, offers a less optimistic view. "In the final analysis," he concludes, "we cannot say that the peasants who have received land live any better materially than they did without land." But, he adds, many peasants do own land; the promise of land ownership has penetrated every corner of the nation, ending the psychological inferiority of the landless and holding out hope to even the most hopeless.²⁰

A SOCIAL REVOLUTION?

Jesús Silva Herzog, the editor of *Cuadernos Americanos* and the former director of the Faculty of Economics at the National University, notes that the violent course of the revolution's initial phase disoriented the economy and took a heavy toll of lives and property. But some, mostly industrialists and urban property owners, did not fare so badly as rural hacendados and village merchants who had their holdings seized or looted. After the termination of the civil war, many became rich by joining the revolution as unscrupulous bureaucrats, labor officials, and politicians. The revolution, Silva Herzog avers, gave impetus to a new and powerful social class, predominately urban, poised to usurp the revolutionary apparatus for personal gain. By the early 1930's, he notes,

¹⁹ Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Social Aspects of Agrarian Reform in Mexico," in R. Stavenhagen, ed., *Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 225. See also Martin C. Needler, "Mexico at the Crossroads," *Current History*, vol. 60, no. 354, February, 1971, p. 67.

²⁰ James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 195.

²¹ Jesús Silva Herzog, "The Mexican Revolution Is Now a Historical Fact," in Ross, ed., *Is the Mexican Revolution Dead?* pp. 103-05.

²² Wilkie, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

²³ François Chevalier, "The Ejido and Political Stability in Mexico," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 175-76, 185.

²⁴ María Elvira Bermúdez, cited by Lewis Hanke, in L. Hanke, ed., *Latin America: A Historical Reader* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 591. See also Anna Macias, "The Mexican Revolution Was No Revolution for Women," in Hanke, ed., pp. 591-601.

²⁵ Timothy King, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 4, part 1, May, 1972, pp. 140-41.

the Mexican revolution elected a millionaire President.²¹

But if the faltering ideological purity of the revolution and its shift from rural to urban emphasis modified substantially the policies of the national government, it is equally true that general economic growth, especially after 1940, benefited the growing urban working class. With irony, Wilkie writes that the basis for a new order in Mexico unintentionally grew out of Mexico's social revolution.²² By 1940, most Mexicans viewed one another as compatriots, in spite of the persistence of severe income inequality from region to region and from social group to social group. The national standard of living had perceptibly risen, at least sufficiently to avoid spontaneous social protest and to keep the anointed Party of the Revolution firmly in control.

Yet millions of Mexicans remained at the bottom of the social ladder. From 800,000 to one million day laborers, *ejidatarios*, and small holders were forced to migrate seasonally to the United States as *bracero* laborers, to supplement their incomes.²³ Anna Macias has shown that the revolution did little to emancipate the Mexican woman, who, in the words of María Elvira Bermúdez, still possesses "the preconceptions about her incapacity, her dependence on man, and her absolute need for resignation that traditionally have weighed her down for centuries."²⁴ Timothy King of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development notes that in spite of three decades of annual economic growth rates of six to seven percent, many have not benefited at all, leaving open to speculation the question whether it was necessary to preserve the traditionally unequal social and economic structure of the past to obtain such a rapid growth rate and whether, in the long run, the classical "trickle down" theory of wealth will operate to any degree of adequacy in the Mexican case.²⁵

Doubts persist today, in spite of the current enthusiasm about Mexico's "Economic Miracle" among manufacturing and commercial groups. The country's proud system of higher education is virtually bursting at the seams: designed for 25,000 students a generation ago, the National University has 80,000 undergraduates and 95,000 more in colleges attached to the university. An invasion of the university campus by police in August, 1973, revived bitter memories of the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre and the resignation of Pablo

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“... the tendency of Mexican society remains a posture of conformity. . . . As a nation of families, Mexicans remain fertile, up to their collective ears in babies, squeezed by inflation, but still buoyed emotionally by a paradoxical mixture of pride in the revolution and disgust with its shortcomings.”

Mexico versus Malthus: National Trends

BY MARVIN ALISKY

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A PHOTOGRAPH OF NINE ragged children hovering around their impoverished peasant mother adorned the cover of a recent issue of Mexico's leading news magazine, the weekly *Tiempo*.¹ The accompanying cover story concerned the republic's population explosion, which the government's Bureau of Statistics calculated at an annual net increment of 3.5 percent for 1973, but which *Forbes* magazine demographers figured at 3.7 percent, the world's worst annual increase in terms of stretching national resources to serve an ever-increasing number of citizens of a nation.²

Thomas Malthus theorized at the end of the eighteenth century that the population of the world tends to increase faster than the food supply: life's basic resources grow in an arithmetic progression while people multiply in a geometric progression. This English political economist warned that unless birth rates could be controlled, poverty and war would provide periodic restrictions on excess populations bedeviling nations.

Certainly until recent decades Mexico paralleled other lands in having a balance of nature. Before widespread inoculations ended or minimized such historic population controls as smallpox and diphtheria, Mexico remained uncrowded, even though only a fraction of her national territory had ever been tilled

at any one time. Birth rates were high, but death rates zoomed even higher. In the last 25 years, however, death rates have shrunk dramatically while fertility has intensified.

As recently as 1950, life expectancy in Mexico averaged only 48 years. By 1965, Mexican longevity had climbed to 60 years, and by 1970, to more than 64 years. Yet the 1970 general census revealed that 55 percent of all Mexicans are 20 years of age or less; this youthful segment accounted for 26.7 million of the total population of 48.3 million officially tabulated in 1970, pressuring government and industrial leaders to try to create 10 million new jobs before 1980.³

As for the rugged Malthusian solution of wars, for 11 years (1810–1821) battles, which eventually forced the Spaniards to end their colonial empire to stop a Vietnamese-like hemorrhaging of Mexican and Spanish blood, helped thin the ranks of potential Mexican parents. So did the revolts of friends and foes of General Santa Ana, who in the 1830's and 1840's went in and out of the presidency like a bad political dream in a governmental echo chamber. Mexico's war with the United States during 1846–1848 and Benito Juárez's struggles against the French army of occupation during 1861–1865 cut down hundreds of thousands of young Mexicans before they could spawn large families. The civil war chapter of the revolution—today a capitalized title for a continuing social reform—took more than one million lives during 1910–1920, at a time when Mexico's population totaled only 15 million.

Malthus also warned that abject poverty would limit excess populations through a high infant mortality rate and through starvation among the poorest people. Mexico still has an infant death rate of 63 per 1,000 live births, relatively high when contrasted

¹ *Tiempo*, December 31, 1973, pp. 14–16. This magazine circulates to United States subscribers as *Hispano Americano* to obviate the mistaken impression that *Tiempo* might be *Time* translated into Spanish.

² “The Stork vs. the Steel Mill,” *Forbes*, August 15, 1973, p. 33.

³ Dirección General de Estadística (Bureau of Statistics), *IX Censo General de Población 1970, Resumen*, vol. 1. Also from this same Bureau of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, *Anuario Estadístico 1972*.

with that in the United States and in the most economically advanced West European nations (under 18 per 1,000). But canceling that possible limitation on annual population increments, the fertility of Mexican women in the child-bearing age group of 13 to 44 years remains high, with 43.1 births per 1,000 adult females.⁴

As for starvation, political scientist Pablo González Casanova of the National University of Mexico analyzed the data on dietary intake from the 1960 census. He found that 49 percent of the rural population regularly ate one or more of four basic foods—meat, fish, milk, or eggs—whereas 51 percent ate none of these. Of the urban population, 87 percent regularly ate one or more of these foods whereas 13 percent did not.⁵

Historian James W. Wilkie, also using 1960 census data, found the same kind of urban-rural breakdown for a balanced diet versus meager subsistence, and for regular consumption of wheat bread versus corn tortillas, with the urban population favored over the rural population in all 29 Mexican states.⁶ Rural Mexicans are four times as likely as urban Mexicans to suffer malnutrition and near-starvation.

The 1970 census, while showing an increase in total numbers, does not show any significant improvement in the disadvantages in dietary intake of rural Mexicans contrasted with the consumption of urban Mexicans, with 47 percent of all Mexicans now classified as rural residents (living in villages or farm-ranch clusters of fewer than 2,500 inhabitants).⁷

Seven million Mexicans, out of 1974's estimated population for the republic of 56 million, endure a marginal existence economically — ill housed, ill clothed, ill fed—perennially hungry but eating just enough to remain alive. So the Malthusian limitations on population have not occurred. Rather, the republic gained 35,000 additional inhabitants in the first week of May, 1974, and will gain 35,050 next week, and so on weekly, with the annual population net increase far more than that of Pakistan or Indonesia, and a full one percent higher than the disastrous yearly population increment of India, a rate which negates that Asian subcontinent's efforts at raising its living standards.

FAMILY PLANNING CLINICS

Millions of Mexican teenagers are pounding on the doors of retail and wholesale firms and the symbolic

gates of ranches and farms, struggling to be absorbed into the job market. In short, the natives are restless, and the government's slogans about the progress of the past half-century—true enough in general terms—no longer soothe the anxiety of millions living at or below the poverty level of income.

Since promulgation of the federal constitution of 1917, the program of continuing social and economic reforms designated to redress the inequities of centuries has been called the revolution, patriotically spelled with a capital "R" to distinguish the ongoing struggle for social justice from the various revolts limited to struggles for political power which preceded the national goals of Francisco Madero, Emiliano Zapata, Venustiano Carranza, Álvaro Obregón, and Plutarco Calles.

The revolution stimulated pride in most Mexican hearts in their own native land and its numerous advances in public life, after decades of despair and self-deprecation. But since the 1950's, the excess population has meant that new citizens multiply faster than new jobs can be created; children multiply faster than additional numbers of teachers can be trained; and extra users of public utilities multiply faster than governmental corporations can expand.

Demographic disequilibrium strains the distribution and communication facilities. Almost half of all Mexicans live in 14 percent of the national territory, the central region or Valley of Mexico, with industrial payrolls overwhelmingly bunched in the metropolitan areas of Mexico City (extending past Tlaltepantla in the state of México.), Monterrey, and Guadalajara, despite a much-heralded campaign by the government to encourage decentralized industries. Automotive gearshift works in Querétaro, shoe factories in León, synthetic fiber plants in Chihuahua, and breweries in Baja California help, but not enough.

A tortuous terrain—more than half of mountainous Mexico rises more than 3,200 feet above sea level—conspires with a climatological spectrum ranging from deserts to swamps to reduce the acreage under natural-rainfall cultivation to 7 percent of the total land, though in recent decades hydroelectric projects have added irrigated acreage; more than 12 percent of Mexico's surface is now being cultivated for crops or grazed by livestock.

In regions of arable soil, heat and excessive weed fertility make crop cultivation arduous. At altitudes with a temperature best suited for physically strenuous labor, water shortages negate some of the manpower output. In regions of abundant water, money and effort must be expended to hold back recurrent natural flooding. In Mexico, nature gives nothing away.

So the circumstances would suggest widespread social pressure to become a nation of smaller families, with typical parents limiting themselves to two or three children instead of the customary eight or

⁴ Inter-American Development Bank, *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America: Annual Report 1971* (Washington, D. C.: IADB, 1972), pp. 253, 344.

⁵ Pablo González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 73.

⁶ James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 225–229.

⁷ *IX Censo General 1970*, vol. 1, pp. 14–16.

more. Yet until 1972, no Mexican government had ever publicly or officially addressed itself to birth control. Even now, with the government position reversed 180 degrees from the age-old posture of encouraging unlimited family size, the verbiage mostly avoids the phrase "birth control." The closest public health officials can come to labeling their new goal euphemistically remains "family planning."

Not until April, 1972, did any Mexican government ever publicly acknowledge the need for limiting the size of families. Only token private efforts had begun in some cities in the 1950's and 1960's, led by the more daring social workers and civic leaders and encouraged by a handful of "radical" writers defying both Catholic and Marxist official policies.

Though claiming a membership of only 5,000, the Communist party of Mexico (*Partido Comunista de México* or PCM), working with Marxists found in the recognized Popular Socialist party (*Partido Popular Socialista* or PPS), has consistently urged Mexicans to maintain larger and larger families. The PPS, which has been on the ballot in national elections since 1949 and which has 10 seats in the current 213-seat Chamber of Deputies of the federal Congress, similarly takes the Marxian line that birth control is a Yankee, Protestant, capitalistic plot to hold down the number of Latin American (and third world brown-skinned) people, so that world economic and political power will not shift from the Northern to the Southern hemisphere, from the rich to the poor nations.

There is little evidence that Mexico's child-begetting masses read or hear such arguments, let alone heed them. Like Catholic Church policy regarding family size, Marxist support has not been the reason most Mexicans have not purchased contraceptives. The reasons can be found through a social-psychological probing of the Mexican mind.

Regarding Church opposition to birth control, Latin American Catholic standards pervade everyday living habits in some nations, such as Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. But in Mexico, racked by years of Church-state political strife from 1910 into the 1930's, no politician supported by the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* or PRI) would risk ending his career by embracing the papal encyclical, *De Humanae Vitae*, against birth control, a gesture reserved by the minor-

ity conservative National Action Party (*Partido de Acción Nacional* or PAN).

Long before Pope Paul VI's encyclical of 1968 exploded like a legal guided missile in the ranks of Catholic modernists throughout Latin America, Church hierarchies and lay leaders alike were debating the traditional Church prohibition of artificial means for preventing conception. But in Mexico, such debate focused not in religious dogma, but rather on societal norms.

The Mexican peasant tradition of raising large families and the social psychology of *machismo*, the cult of male virility, kept both the government and the rank-and-file citizens from embracing birth control.⁸ Before death rates plunged, large numbers of offspring had been necessary for a peasant-farmer (*campesino*) and his wife. If they begot 16 children, perhaps 11 would die at birth or in infancy and 5 would be available to harvest crops, tend livestock, churn butter, make repairs in the home, and carry out other duties in a household devoid of labor-saving devices or rudimentary appliances.

Political scientist Evelyn P. Stevens has written extensively about the feminine accommodation to machismo, *marianismo*, the Mexican cult of venerating the Virgin Mary and the related exalting of motherhood, thereby putting women on a pedestal from which they can dominate the home life in terms of filial relations, rather than demanding the North American sexual equality in careers epitomized by Women's Liberation.⁹

Noted Mexican writer Carlos Fuentes, in his novels and political articles, has probed at length the social-psychological factors of Mexican machismo, agreeing in his conclusions with the observations of Octavio Paz and Samuel Ramos.

Essayist-novelist-diplomat Paz finds the Mexican enveloped in solitude and, because of Mexico's history, suspicious of strangers. Paz typifies the Mexican as drawing comfort from his maleness, his feeling of being *muy macho*, and demonstrating this prowess by begetting children. Paz asserts that the macho father image constitutes "the model which the Mexican people form of men in power . . . hacienda owners, politicians, generals, captains of industry."¹⁰

Philosopher and social psychologist Ramos found the Mexican psyche striving for status by stressing male prowess symbolized by fathering large families.¹¹ With such an attitude pervading society, Mexican Presidents have not been eager to preach the need for slowing down the annual population increment. Rather, they have pointed with pride as the increasing population total approached the symbolic figure of 50 million, making Mexico one of the world's larger nations, comparable in size to Italy, France, and Britain.

As late as February, 1972, President Luis Echeverría, himself the father of eight, commenting on a proposed governmental program to slow down the

⁸ Samuel Ramos, *Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 54-68.

⁹ Evelyn P. Stevens, "Mexican Machismo," *Western Political Quarterly*, December, 1965, pp. 848-857; Stevens, "The Prospects for a Women's Liberation Movement in Latin America," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, May, 1973, pp. 313-321.

¹⁰ Octavio Paz, *The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 82.

¹¹ Ramos, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-67.

population growth, asserted: "It would not have positive results. The choice of having children must be made freely by Mexican families." (The Republic's Chief Executive had said the same thing twice before, after assuming office in December, 1970.)

A POLICY SWITCH

Only two months later, however, on April 27, 1972, the office of the President announced that the federal government would face "an unavoidable need. In 1971, more than two million babies were added to our populace, equivalent to 255 new citizens every hour, and we do not have adequate enough resources for such a drastic increase." The President did not make the first reversal-of-policy statement directly himself, but let an assistant secretary of the Ministry of the Presidency break it.

Two hours later, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Public Health held his own press conference and added the missing volatile words: "The government will embark on a national program of family planning."

The pilot project, begun in January, 1973, linked the Ministry of Health and Welfare (*Secretaría de Salud y Asistencia* or SSA) clinics, the Social Security system (*Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social* or IMSS) clinics, and the Foundation for Population Studies (*Fundación de Estudios de la Población* or FEP), a private organization started in 1965. The FEP is financed by the International Planned Parenthood Federation, the Ford Foundation, the United Nations, and various Mexican and foreign private sources, now augmented by the SSA and IMSS funds.

In 1972, the FEP maintained only 55 family-planning clinics throughout Mexico; this was the skeleton framework upon which the government began its own meager program in 1973 to slow the republic's population growth.

After the startling April, 1972, announcement, made impersonally in the name of the Mexican government by sub-Cabinet level spokesmen, President Echeverría's own endorsement became apparent as he began to use phrases such as "voluntary family planning" and "responsible paternity" in speeches and interviews during the second half of 1972 and throughout 1973.

Variations of one key sentence recurred in eight different presidential assertions during 1972 and 1973: "Mexico has paternity with a sense of responsibility, which implies something else from just birth control."¹²

The President recognized the need for caution in semantics during a period in which a deeply rooted social tradition would be changed. For a year and a half, the weekly magazine *Tiempo* has been using a

boxed two-word slogan as a filler between certain advertisements. It simply proclaims "*Paternidad Responsable*." Other Mexican periodicals have used the slogan less consistently. By June, 1973, the phrase had reached radio and television discussion panels.

One billboard facing a slum in northeast Mexico City proclaims: "Millions of our children will not find jobs, schools, or health care without responsible paternity." The trouble is, many of the poverty-stricken whose hovels face that sign cannot read.

Mexico went from a literacy rate of only 30 percent in 1910 to 70 percent in 1960, but since then has slipped back a couple of percentage points because of the sudden accumulation of extra citizens, youngsters who cannot find classroom spaces anywhere.

NO MORE "TREASURE OF THE SIERRA MADRE"

From the early days of the Spanish colonial era in the 1520's, through independence from Spain in the 1820's, through the 1930's, Mexico's economy depended on the mining of minerals. Silver, petroleum, gold, zinc, copper, sulphur, and graphite had been the mainstays of export earnings. Even the ouster of Porfirio Díaz, the presidential dictator who governed from 1876 into 1911, did not abruptly end Mexico's dependence on foreign mining companies, whose engineers and administrators remained central in the ranks of management.

Jobs in mines represented the big alternative in work styles to farming and ranching. With the expropriation of the foreign-owned oil companies in 1938 and the creation of the governmental corporation Pemex, President Lázaro Cárdenas began his nation's disengagement from the semi-colonial overtones of allowing a foreign-operated mining industry to remain the core of the economy.

Alliteratively, Mexico shifted from mining to manufacturing, especially during the 1946-1952 presidency of Miguel Alemán. Those striving for upward mobility from the working class to the middle class or upper class no longer packed burros on the trail of silver and gold. The centuries-old "Treasure of the

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¹² *Excelsior*, June 18, October 1, 1972; March 1, April 18, 1973.

"In the short term, Mexico must decide what kind of an Indian problem she wishes, for it is very unlikely that the problem will go away with either the assimilationist or pluralist policies. The longer run may see the disintegration and collapse of the Indian community under population pressures and resource exhaustion, problems unfortunately shared with all Mexicans."

Mexico's Persistent Indians

BY RALPH L. BEALS

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MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS after the revolution made the "Incorporation of the Indian" one of its major slogans, Mexico still has several million Indians, and many Mexicans consider the Indians to be a major national problem. Others, principally urban dwellers and residents in non-Indian areas, are either indifferent to the Indian problem, or consider it subordinate to such problems as inflation, jobs, the direction of industrialization, urbanism, the modernization of agriculture, or inequalities in the distribution of wealth and political power.

Mexico's Indians, it should be made clear, do not consider themselves to be a problem. They constitute no organized, aggressive, or separatist movement. Efforts, mainly by non-Indians, to organize pan-Indian movements, such as have emerged in the United States, have been almost totally unsuccessful. Indians see themselves as having problems such as inadequate land; encroachments of mestizo peasants and landholders on Indian land and resources; exploitation by employers, traders, and buyers of Indian products; and efforts by outsiders to destroy local customs and community-based social, ceremonial, and political structures. The government is variously considered oppressive and interfering, or benign and protective. But all the problems are the fault of mestizos. The Indian, in his own terms, is not a problem, but he does have a mestizo problem.

Mestizos¹ who consider the Indian a problem do so for a variety of reasons, but most of them relate to nationalism and ideas about the nature of the na-

tion-state. Some believe that Mexico, as a nation, cannot tolerate the presence of groups with different, primitive or "barbarous" customs, unable to speak Spanish, and ignorant of or opposed to national goals and values. Industrialists, businessmen, and economists believe that the Indian fails to realize his productive capacity, contributes little to the national economy, and provides little market for industrial consumer's goods. Political theorists and idealists with a democratic orientation argue for Indian political participation to strengthen the state and enable Indians to protect themselves, while some practical politicians find it intolerable that they are unable to organize or manipulate a potential source of support. Finally, many intellectuals, including most anthropologists, see the Indians as occupying a despised social status and forming the most poverty-stricken, exploited, and powerless group in Mexico, living in conditions intolerable in a modern state dedicated through a major revolution to social reform and the achievement of social justice.

A more generalized reason for concern about the Indian stems from the rise of mestizos to power as a result of the revolution, and the need to improve the self-image of many Mexicans. Unable to deny their Indian heritage, mestizos needed to develop pride in it. One approach to this was a glorification of the Indian past that accounts in large part for the extraordinary support given to archaeological excavations since the revolution. In addition, the status of contemporary Indians needed to be raised and the Indians shown to be capable of modern civilization.

Thus for a variety of reasons, many mestizos agree that there is an Indian problem and that "government should do something about it." As to what should be done, however, there was and is major disagreement about both ends and means. The most fundamental cleavage perhaps is between "assimilationists" who interpret "incorporation" to mean the ultimate

¹ The term *mestizo* originally referred to the offspring of Indian-white sexual unions. In time, the term *mestizo* came to represent a class pattern of life, adopted by many Indians. Although genetically most mestizos are partly or entirely of Indian ancestry, the term has lost all biological meaning and come to refer to a way of life. In current terminology, both mestizos and Indians (as well as the survivors of the small European-derived or -oriented former elite), are all Mexicans.

disappearance of the Indian into mestizo society, and those who favor a "pluralistic" solution in which Indians may continue to exist in their own communities, preserving the best of their native values and way of life, but achieving higher living standards, a measure of social and political equality, and a position of dignity and self-respect.

Both these positions date from the sixteenth century. Early colonial assimilationists, in effect, sought a merger of the Spanish and Indian class societies in which Spaniards would dominate the upper class while the Indian masses continued in a subordinate role similar to that of Spanish peasants (or, in extreme cases, as slaves). The pluralist point of view, generally held by the Crown and the religious, worked for the establishment of separate Spanish and Indian "republics," modeled in part on the free town as it had developed in Spain during the Reconquest period. This policy restricted the power of the nobility and extended the powers of the monarchical bureaucracy. The pluralist view probably led to the characteristic features of the modern Indian community, although the subject badly needs additional research.

Throughout Mexican history, the various assimilationist movements have been tinged with racism. Assimilationists tend to regard Indians as inferior or childlike, fitted only to occupy a subordinate position as a subject race whose culture offers no contribution to an emerging society. On the contrary, pluralists believe in the innate capacities of the Indians and hold that the values and life styles of the Indian can contribute to Mexican society and deserve preservation.

Following the revolution, assimilationists and pluralists found themselves in agreement on some issues. Both saw the illiteracy of the masses and the inability of many Indians to speak Spanish as major obstacles to Mexico's development, and agreed on the need for an expanded and revitalized educational system. But they disagreed on methods and ultimate goals. As a result, the *Secretaría de Educación Pública* became a major arena of conflict. Although other agencies were sometimes involved, today most programs directed specifically at the Indians are administered by this ministry.

José Vasconcelos, one of the principal architects of the federal rural school system, was implicitly and sometimes explicitly racist. He viewed the Indian as passive and uncreative by nature, and thought that

Indian culture had nothing to offer to a new Mexico. In this, he differed little from the dominant views held during the pre-revolutionary Porfiriato. Only as the Indian disappeared, in this view, could Mexico become truly great. The merger of the Indian into the mestizo group would somehow give rise to a new "cosmic" race which would develop an outstanding and unique Mexican culture. In any event, research on contemporary Indians was useless; Mexico's emerging rural school system should be uniform and centralized, and should make no concessions to the problems of Indian pupils.

The anthropologists Manuel Gamio and Moisés Saenz, the latter for many years a sub-Secretary of Education, differed sharply from Vasconcelos on many issues.² Both urged the importance of studying Indian cultures and developing special programs adapted to Indian needs. Gamio's monumental study of the population of the Valley of Teotihuacan³ indeed played an important role in shaping the initial rural school program (although significantly it was published by the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento* and not by the *Secretaría de Educación Pública*). The mestizo drive for a better self-image also brought some government support for research, although much of the money went for archaeology. Some special experimental programs designed for Indians were also supported, often outside the Ministry of Education, but initially these were underfinanced and hampered by lack of qualified personnel.

The problem of language instruction is particularly informative. Even the most ardent pluralists agree that the Indian must learn Spanish, not only to participate in Mexican society but to protect his own interests. Assimilationists, however, seeking to end the use of Indian languages and educational programs, made no concession to the monolingual pupil. Experimental programs both in Mexico and elsewhere demonstrated rather clearly that bilingual instruction in the early grades not only speeded up the learning process but in the end produced a more competent use of Spanish, without eliminating the use of the local Indian language. Assimilationists rejected the evidence in favor of such programs. Most mestizos agreed, regarding bilingual programs as absurd or as subversive attempts to prevent the use of Spanish. As a result, bilingual education is very rare in Mexico. Ironically, Mexicans in the United States increasingly are demanding bilingual education for themselves, although it is denied to the Mexican Indian.

Despite the deficiencies in the rural school system for the Indians, data show that the percentage of Indian monolinguals and, to a lesser extent, bilinguals in the Mexican population has been decreasing. Assimilationists point to this as evidence that their approach is correct and that the Indians are disappearing. Indians, it is claimed, are being assimilated and

² For a review of these conflicts see Ramón Eduardo Ruiz U., "The Struggle for a National Culture in Rural Education," *Estudios Antropológicos publicados en homenaje al doctor Manuel Gamio* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México y la Sociedad Mexicana de Antropología, 1956), pp. 472-490.

³ Manuel Gamio, *La Población del Valle de Teotihuacan*, 3 vols. (Mexico City: Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, Dirección de Antropología, 1922).

"mestizoized." These figures are misleading. In most Indian areas the absolute numbers of speakers of Indian languages have increased as Indians have shared in the population explosion.

WHAT IS AN INDIAN?

Is language alone an adequate criterion of "Indian-ness"? Nathan Whetten, in his *Rural Mexico*,⁴ was one of the first observers to point out that census data showed that more than half the population of Mexico, including many members of the urban lower classes, followed an essentially Indian way of life in material matters (e.g., food habits, dress, housing and house furnishings). Does speaking Spanish, owning a transistor radio, sleeping on a mattress on a raised bed instead of a mat on the floor, riding trucks and buses, and even working in a factory make an Indian into a mestizo? The answer is "not necessarily." As long as an individual lives in or (if a migrant) still identifies with a village which maintains a distinctive set of customs and values and an internally based status and security system, he may still be an Indian. Even some villages where Spanish has long been spoken and whose residents identify themselves as mestizos prove on examination to be basically Indian in their internal organization, attitudes, and life styles. The Indian problem hence may be broader than it appears at first glance, and it may rest primarily on the nature of the community rather than on the language of individuals.

The domination of government policy by assimilationists became weaker under the administration of General Lázaro Cárdenas. With the establishment of a department of anthropology in the *Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Biológicas*, Mexico began to train a cadre of individuals specially equipped to deal with Indian programs both in research and in action. In 1939, the *Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia* was founded under the direction of Alfonso Caso, who was emerging as one of the leading figures in Mexican anthropology. The institute (INAH) took over the administration of existing historical and anthropological museums and monuments as well as existing research programs. In 1942, it took over the administration of the former department of anthropology, now renamed the *Escuela Nacional de Antropología*. It expanded archaeological programs and established divisions for other fields of anthropological and historical research. An active public information program included extensive scholarly and popular publications and an ambitious program of regional museums.

INAH has played a major role in making both Mexico and the world aware of the greatness of past

Indian civilizations. It has been less successful in developing respect for the contemporary Indian. Many mestizos have come to feel pride in their Indian ancestry, but they still do not care much for their contemporary Indian cousins.

A third and major step in a surprisingly logical development of Indian policy was the establishment of the *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (INI) in 1948, also organized and for many years directed by Alfonso Caso. This institute, dedicated to Indian welfare, presented for the first time an integrated program with a clear-cut philosophy and a systematic although flexible methodology. The philosophy is basically pluralistic. Although Spanish is considered to be a necessary tool for the Indian, he need not give up his native language. Indian cultures are considered to have useful and even admirable values, and Indian communities are to be strengthened and preserved. Indian economies and living levels are to be raised; health services and communications are to be provided; and appropriate education is to be offered. Indian rights are to be protected and Indian exploitation is to be prevented wherever possible. Local customs, internal social and political structures, ceremonies and religion are not to be tampered with. In all these areas, research showed the Indians to be very sensitive.

In the INI program, regional centers are established where living conditions are sufficiently attractive to hold together a group of specialists in agronomy, public health, and education. These are assisted by *promotores* in the villages. The latter are young Indians, trained in the center, who return to their home villages as paid agents of INI. Overall administration in each case is in the hands of anthropologists.

The INI program has attracted international attention and has had some success. Not all the regional centers have been equally well run; not all anthropologists are good administrators. Centers are costly. They often are under financed and cover too large an area. The Mexico City bureaucracy is top-heavy. Many Indians and Indian areas are not served by centers. Administrations have varied in their support of INI although generally support has grown.

The continuance of INI along present lines seems reasonably well assured for a time, despite the deaths of Alfonso Caso and some of his strongest supporters like Manuel Gamio. The present associate director, Alfonso Villa Rojas, was long director of the first and still the most successful regional center in Chiapas. The present director, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, also was long associated with Caso and for years has been one of the most articulate spokesmen for INI and for the pluralist pro-Indian position. His present dual appointment as a sub-Secretary of Education suggests considerable government support. Never-

⁴ Norman Whetten, *Rural Mexico* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

theless, there is increasing opposition to INI and its approach.

Assimilationists, of course, have been in continuous opposition to the basically pluralistic approach, but there is also growing opposition springing from INI's successes. In most Indian areas, many mestizos for generations have exploited the Indians. To the degree INI programs give Indians greater economic independence, these mestizos are often bitterly opposed to INI. The INI has tried to stop the encroachment by mestizo peasants or landholders on Indian lands, to establish marketing cooperatives, and to prevent the exploitation of forests by commercial lumbering interests. Most mestizo opposition to the INI (except for the lumbering interests) is scattered and local, but increasingly it provides ammunition for opponents of INI in the capital.

In the past five or six years the policies of INI and the pluralist approach have also come under vigorous attack by a young group of Marxist-oriented anthropologists. In meetings, in the press, and in such books as *De Eso Que Lllaman Antropologia a Mexicana*,⁵ anthropology is said to have been the handmaiden of imperialism. The INI program has been characterized as leading to "institutionalized cultural marginality" and the perpetuation of "internal colonialism." The alternatives this group envisions are unclear in detail but seem to put them clearly on the side of the assimilationists and to involve mestizization of the Indian and elimination of the specifically Indian community.

Assimilationists point out that as the rural educational system does its work and as the Indians become Spanish speakers they are no longer "trapped" in their local communities. Even the best rural schools prepare pupils for urban life rather than for the improvement of village conditions.⁶ Many individuals have chosen this option. Others have merged into the rural labor force and, in some cases, peasant Indian villages have become peasant mestizo villages.

A limited number of Indians have been able to attend secondary or technical schools or even universities. In the very "Indian" state of Oaxaca, for example, one can find Indian schoolteachers, store clerks, stenographers, accountants, and even an occasional engineer. Such individuals are clearly exceptions; secondary and more advanced education are not within the grasp of most Indians. Secondary schools are confined to cities and larger towns; it is the exceptional family that has the resources and is

willing to make the sacrifices necessary to send children to them. Parents must pay for food, lodging, books, and school supplies, usually additional clothing, and often fees. As there are usually fewer places than applicants, peasants, with their usually inferior rural education, often cannot compete with the urban applicants.

Assimilationists argue that the normal rural education provides sufficient control of literacy, Spanish, elementary arithmetic, and background knowledge to move to a town or city and in some regions thousands of Indians have done so. Their departure from their home village merely relieves pressures caused by an expanding population. The rural Indian problem remains, and this problem is primarily related to the Indian community.

THE MAYO INDIANS

The Mayo Indians of Sonora provide an extreme but instructive example. Economically, the Mayos differ little from lower-class mestizos. Many work at similar jobs on large farms or in towns, or are small farmers either in ejidos shared with mestizos or on private small holdings. They differ little from mestizos in housing and dress. Most speak Spanish. A good many Mayos live among mestizos, although the majority reside in hamlets of predominantly Mayos. These hamlets are located in *municipios* the majority of whose residents are mestizos. The latter occupy all municipal offices and exercise all civil authority. On the surface the Mayos appear to be becoming mestizos, yet they stubbornly refuse to do so despite a century and half or more of pressure. Despite their lack of political power or their complete residential isolation, they maintain their identity as Mayos and cling to a Mayo culture.

The key to the persistence of a Mayo community is an elaborate ceremonial system in which each Mayo is expected to participate to the extent of his abilities. Most of the ceremonies revolve about Catholic saints, and Christian symbols play an important part, but some rituals have aboriginal antecedents. Participation confers prestige on individuals and offers both personal and community benefits in health and spiritual well-being. The community includes both the living and the dead. Prayers for ancestors are included in many ceremonies. Many families keep books in which ancestral names are recorded. And

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⁵ Arturo Warman, et al., *De Eso Que Lllaman Antropologia Mexicana* (Mexico City: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1970).

⁶ Ralph L. Beals, *Cherán: A Sierra Tarascan Village* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, 1946), no. 2. Reprinted by Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., New York, 1973.

Ralph L. Beals is an anthropologist who has traveled extensively in Mexico. His major publications are monographs based on extended field residence among the Yaqui-Mayo of Sonora, the Tarascans of Michoacan, and the Mixe and Zapotec of Oaxaca. A major work, *The Peasant Marketing System of Oaxaca, Mexico*, is in press.

The government's announcements of educational programs for 1974 indicate "a continuing effort to bring all Mexican children to the classroom; continuation of the literacy campaign; and further experimentation in educational methodology. But they also indicate further broadening of the Mexican concept of centralized control of education as a means of molding national character."

Educational Reform and Government Intervention in Mexico

By GIORGIO PERISSINOTTO

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ON NOVEMBER 26, 1973, President Luis Echeverría Alvarez signed the Federal Law of Education, thus enabling historians and educators to evaluate a program many had begun to consider mythical. The administration had announced impending educational reform as early as December 2, 1970, one day after the President and his Cabinet members took the oath of office.¹ The specific nature of that reform, however, was not revealed until its implementation three years later.

Reference to educational reform had become as predictable a feature of speeches by Mexican politicians as the insistence that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI) was continuing the revolution begun in 1910. Since its charter in 1929, the government party (then called the National Revolutionary Party) has won every presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial election, and has effectively controlled a vast majority of local offices.² The PRI hierarchy has been vitally concerned and intimately involved with national education, thus maintaining a tradition that started

with an insistence on secular education in the constitution of 1917. The relevant constitutional provisions are:

Instruction shall be free;
All instruction in public institutions of learning shall be secular;
No religious corporation or minister of any religious creed shall establish or direct schools of primary instruction;
Private primary schools may only be established subject to official supervision;
School attendance is compulsory for children under the age of 15.³

Direct government participation in education began under the presidency of Alvaro Obregón (1920–1924). In 1921, the constitution was revised to create the Secretariat of Public Education (*Secretaría de Educación Pública*, SEP) and to authorize the federal government to establish and support elementary schools throughout Mexico. A period of frantic expansion of educational facilities followed under the direction of José Vasconcelos. The period was remarkable for its awareness of the fact that the educational system is the vehicle through which national character—a uniquely Mexican character independent of the legacies of colonialism—can be instilled in the citizenry.⁴ The idea of education as socio-political indoctrination reached its climax during the Lázaro Cárdenas administration (1934–1940). National goals and the educational process were made inseparable; this is apparent in the often quoted and much revised Article 3 of the constitution:

The education imparted by the state shall be a socialistic one and, in addition to excluding all religious doctrine, shall combat fanaticism and prejudices by organizing instruction and activities in a way that shall permit the creation in youth of an exact and rational concept of the universe and social life.⁵

¹ *Diario Oficial*, November 29, 1973, and April 16, 1971. This publication is the official Mexican government gazette. One should note that the signing of legislation does not coincide with the date of publication in the *Diario Oficial*. It is not unusual for important edicts to be made public months after they have been signed.

² Pablo González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 12.

³ Article 3 of the constitution of Mexico as reported in Clark C. Gill, *Education in a Changing Mexico* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1969), p. 21.

⁴ For a penetrating study of the role of education in the formation of national character, see Josefina Vázquez de Knauth, *Nacionalismo y educación en México* (El Colegio de México, 1970).

⁵ As reported in Gill, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

The Cárdenas administration dramatically increased the number of schools in rural and working class areas, but, not coincidentally, it also polarized public opinion and exacerbated the Church's resistance to secular education. Article 3 was amended in 1945 by the Avila Camacho administration (1940–1946) to read:

The education imparted by the state—federal government, states, municipalities—shall aim to develop harmoniously all the faculties of the human being and will instill in him love of country and a sense of international solidarity in independence and justice.⁶

One central point emerges from this brief survey of key documents in the history of Mexican education: the nation's schools have a clearly recognized ideological function which must be borne in mind by anyone attempting to understand the nation's pedagogical structure. The federal government controls every aspect of education. Educational philosophy emanates from government-supported bodies like the National Technical Council on Education. All elementary and secondary schools must use the official textbooks, elaborated and distributed by the government Commission for the Free Textbook. The free textbook program implemented by this commission was a major step toward both universal literacy and instruction in more advanced and specialized areas. From kindergarten through secondary school, every Mexican student receives the necessary instructional materials without charge. In fact, in many villages, the only printed material is the text distributed by the federal government. The free textbook program elevates the country's educational level, and the program has been universally and justly admired.

Even in this fundamental area, however, education has been construed as a process for imparting the proper kind of patriotism. Former President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz's comment on free textbooks is revealing!

The free textbook is a right of the Mexican citizen. Its implementation strengthens the unity of public consciousness; let us remember always that Mexico is one country and that, consequently, there can only exist one history of Mexico.⁷

The goal of uniformity has been pursued through the construction of the physical facilities necessary for education. The government-supported Administrative Committee for the Federal Program of School Construction (*Comité Administrador del Programa Federal de Construcción de Escuelas*, CAPFCE), created in 1944, has won wide acclaim throughout Latin America for its ingenious prefabricated structures that now make up a majority of Mexican

schools. It should not be forgotten that these schools are physical evidence of the uniformity of the environment in which students learn as well as an attempt to bring education to deprived areas.

THE ELEVEN-YEAR PLAN

The year 1959, during the administration of Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964), marked the beginning of the Eleven-Year Plan, 1959–1970, officially known as the National Plan to Improve and Expand Elementary Education in Mexico (*Plan Nacional para el Mejoramiento y la Expansión de la Educación Primaria en México*). A commission charged with studying the state of the school-aged population (6 to 15 years of age) had reported in 1958 that of 7,634,000 children, only 4,437,000 were actually attending school. The remaining 3,197,000 were not receiving any education at all, because there were simply not enough classrooms and teachers. The government began a massive campaign to improve the education of Mexican children which yielded tangible results.

The major criticism one can direct at the plan was that it was designed almost exclusively to increase educational facilities rather than to revise and ameliorate the quality of instruction. Thousands of schools were built and thousands of new teachers were certified. The program's statistical success was impressive, but in analyzing any figures on the expansion of educational facilities one must remember that Mexico's school population increases at an annual rate of 3.3 percent. After the Eleven-Year Plan, 75 percent of the school-aged children were in class. The government's success in bringing education to those segments of the population traditionally denied its advantages must be evaluated with caution, however. Enrollment figures can be misleading. For example, the drop-out rate at the elementary school level is a staggering 69.4 percent; and while 54 percent of the urban elementary population remains in school until graduation, only a dismally low 9 percent of rural children attain this conventional mark of functional literacy. The Eleven-Year Plan, through the National Council on Education, also established directives which served as guidelines for curriculum planning in the more recent educational reforms. Elementary education should be geared to: protect health and improve physical fitness; promote study of the physical environment and conservation of natural resources; create understanding of the social life and improve its quality; teach creative activities; teach practical activities; promote the elements of culture.⁸

The Eleven-Year Plan also included essential goals for secondary education, aimed at social strata and geographical areas that had been systematically excluded. Eighty percent of elementary school graduates were to continue their education, primarily in terminal technical schools which (although less pres-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷ Quoted in Roberto Amorós, ed., *Ideas políticas del Presidente Gustavo Díaz Ordaz* (Mexico City: Editorial Ruta, 1966), pp. 268–69.

⁸ Gill, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

tigious than the national preparatory system) produce the skilled workers indispensable in a technically developing country.

THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

The Eleven-Year Plan spanned the years 1959–1970. During his administration (1964–1970), President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz made occasional bewildering references to educational reform which implied that a series of new reforms were being undertaken when in fact these reforms were obviously begun under the López Mateos administration. The 1970 pronouncement by Agustín Yáñez, Secretary of Education, to the effect that the educational reform was in progress, contained more substance. He outlined the achievements of his tenure and mentioned several innovations beyond the original scope of the Eleven-Year Plan:⁹

Vocational training, previously almost non-existent, begun in 1968;

Expansion of the school system, supposedly geared to keep pace with demographic and economic growth;

Simplification of curricula, reduction and redistribution into subjects and activities, with the objective of providing a dual role for each discipline: as a vehicle of culture and a tool for the growth of the individual;

Educational television, first used in the literacy campaign in 1965 and subsequently in select secondary school systems;

Adoption of pedagogical methodology aimed at “learning by doing” and “teaching by producing.” These principles, although not novel to Americans, have been considered revolutionary in Mexico and have radically transformed the content and orientation of the free textbooks;

The humanities in technical education, with increased emphasis on humanistic subjects in technical schools, started in 1965;

Increased participation of the Secretariat of Education in cultural affairs and publications, begun in 1965.

From several points of view, the reform schematized in the above summary of Yáñez's remarks produced meaningful changes in Mexican education. Methodological innovations have been implemented and greatly expanded by the Echeverría administration; pedagogical activity in Mexican schools today would be totally unfamiliar to those who graduated only a few years ago.

A few examples will illustrate the radically new approach to teaching fostered by the current Secretary of Education, Victor Bravo Ahuja. Textbooks are no longer icons but have become real tools for learning—many even contain pages that the student is to cut out, fold, and color to illustrate various concepts

of language, arithmetic, and science. Parenthetically, the government was fully aware that it also had to furnish scissors and crayons and has done so throughout the country. Given the current interest in the United States in integrating modern linguistic theory into elementary education, it is worthy of remark that Mexican children learn and utilize the linguistic concepts of “phoneme” and “lexeme” very early in their elementary education.

Science is also made directly relevant to the pupil's experience. For example, the formation of mold is illustrated by experiments involving tortillas and other common foods. The national textbooks, the teacher's manuals that accompany them, and the mandatory seminars on their use guarantee that such innovations are actually practiced and do not remain ideas in the file of an Education Ministry's clerk.

NEW SUBSECRETARIATS

Such innovative pedagogical methods have characterized the Echeverría regime since its inauguration. The administration's periodic announcements of educational reform have in fact pertained to bureaucratic reorganization of the Secretariat of Education rather than to further changes in goals and techniques. The *Diario Oficial* of April 16, 1971, reported an “organic modification” in the structure of the Secretariat of Education. The General Subsecretariat was abolished and four new Subsecretariats were formed: Subsecretariat for Primary and Normal Education (*Subsecretaría de Educación Primaria y Normal*); Subsecretariat for Secondary, Technical and Higher Education (*Subsecretaría de Educación Media, Técnica y Superior*); Subsecretariat for Popular Culture and Non-scholastic Education (*Subsecretaría de Cultura Popular y Educación Extraescolar*); Subsecretariat for Educational Planning and Coordination (*Subsecretaría de Planeación y Coordinación Educativa*).

The official edict was followed by a high-level First Cycle of Conferences and Seminars on the Educational Reform inaugurated by the President himself on February 12, 1971. The significance of such structural modifications was not readily apparent, and it was not until several months later that the government explained in detail the theoretical and practical functions of the new Subsecretariats. The new law was much more than a simple reorganization, for it significantly increased governmental control of Mexican life. In defining the agencies' jurisdiction, the federal government in effect extended its dominance into the cultural and recreational spheres. An increasing number of museums, especially the regional ones, are being funded by the SEP, which is simultaneously supporting more and more concerts. The creation of a Subsecretariat of Popular Culture and Non-scholastic Education gave the federal govern-

⁹ *Excelsior* (Mexico City), September 2, 1970; December 5, 1970.

ment as large a voice in Indian culture and art as in Indian education; the Subsecretary of this important office is Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, an eminent anthropologist, who is also director of the National Indian Institute (*Instituto Nacional Indigenista*). Through such activities for the masses as the People's Sunday Concerts in public parks and auditoriums, the government regulates nearly every form of recreation. The Secretariat of Education is increasing its involvement in publishing by adding to its textbooks a major series of scholarly or semi-scholarly publications such as SEP Setentas and SEP-INI.

In his first State of the Nation message, President Luis Echeverría Alvarez announced the creation of three new paragovernmental agencies destined to cover additional and broader aspects of education:

The National Council for Educational Development (*Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo*) was established to coordinate contributions to education from all sectors of society.

The Center for the Study of Advanced Educational Methods and Procedures (*Centro para el Estudio de Medios y Procedimientos Avanzados de la Educación*) was founded to study new trends in education and advise as to their applicability to the Mexican milieu.

The National Council on Science and Technology was created to stimulate specialized research in projects of high national priority, to encourage and coordinate institutional research, and to organize a large fellowship program for study abroad by Mexican students and scholars. This council, in collaboration with the American Association for the Advancement of Science, sponsored the highly successful First Continental Meeting on Science and Man in the Americas held in Mexico City in the summer of 1973.

President Echeverría also indicated that, in response to the nation's urgent need for technical expertise, many secondary schools were being restructured as technical secondary schools and that several regional technical institutes (pre-university level) were already under construction and many more were being planned.

Clearly, this vast increase of federal regulation was more than a simple reorganization of the educational system. Its scope demanded new enabling legislation. The new Federal Law of Education was duly signed by the President on November 26, 1973, and was published almost immediately in the *Diario Oficial* of November 29. In addition to codifying the structural changes previously examined, the new law emphasizes the government's educational monopoly. As reported in the *Diario Oficial*, Article 5 of the new law states that:¹⁰

Education . . . will be subject to the principles set forth in Article 3 of the Constitution . . . and will have the following objectives:

II. To create and strengthen national consciousness and the sense of international coexistence.

III. To attain, through the teaching of the national tongue, a language common to all Mexicans, without jeopardizing the use of indigenous languages.

V. To encourage and develop knowledge of and respect for national institutions.

XIV. To instill a knowledge of democracy as a form of government and coexistence which allows every citizen to participate in making decisions destined to improve society.

Article 9 reads in part:

Religious corporations, ministers of the faith, societies which by exclusive or predominant practice engage in educational activities and societies or associations directly or indirectly connected with the propagation of any religious credo, will in no manner intervene in educational institutions, elementary, secondary, or normal, of any type or level, whose beneficiaries are workers or peasants.

Article 24 goes further and states that the Secretariat of Education reserves for itself the right to: "Extend, deny, or revoke authorization to individuals to impart education at the primary, secondary, normal and on any level to workers and peasants."

This law explicitly abrogates sections of the Organic Law of Public Education (*Ley Orgánica de Educación Pública*) passed on December 31, 1941, and published in the *Diario Oficial* of January 23, 1942. At the same time that the government was extending the right of the SEP to regulate other areas of national life, it unequivocally affirmed its exclusive power over what Mexican children learn and who would teach it to them.

The reaction of the teaching profession at large has been mixed and difficult to assess. Primary and secondary schools with open religious affiliations are afraid that they will not be allowed to continue functioning and are frantically preparing to submit themselves to periodic government inspections. Many nuns and priests believe that their licenses to teach will be revoked. The teacher in the public school system is, as always, alarmed by the reform. Reform often means primarily a change of supervisors and innumerable bureaucratic procedures; it often means having to change teaching methodology to conform to the new free textbook; almost always it involves

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¹⁰ I will limit quotations to the points pertinent to the discussion. The full text of the Federal Law of Education (*Ley Federal de Educación*) can be consulted in the *Diario Oficial*, November 29, 1973.

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"Today, a system of linked privileges, extended by the PRI to the various interest groups that support it and immortalized by the name 'revolution,' is responsible for the stability and the continuity of the Mexican political apparatus."

Mexico under Echeverría

BY SALVATORE BIZZARRO

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EVEN BEFORE HE LEFT Mexico City to tour the countryside in early January, 1974, in an attempt to go out to the people, Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–1976) knew that economically, socially and politically his country was at a crossroad. Stable and relatively peaceful for four decades, Mexico has achieved one of the highest rates of economic growth of the developing nations. Inflation has risen from about 6 percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 1973, but compared to inflation in other Latin American countries this sounds like a success story.¹ Nonetheless, economic growth has been uneven in Mexico, and the gap between rich and poor is still enormous.

The country continues to face many problems: both the advocates of free enterprise and those opposed to the "selling" of the country to foreign capitalistic interests have been angered by the President's economic policies; the universities are experiencing another period of unrest; in the last congressional elections of July 1, 1973, the real loser was the old guard within

the ruling party; 1973 was also a bad year for agriculture, as an earthquake and heavy floods in the central plateau and in the low-lying eastern gulf states dealt a heavy blow to an economy already eroding because of rising prices. Perhaps the most significant failure of the Echeverría government has been its attempt to control inflation without introducing needed structural reforms. One asks if Echeverría is not putting too much time and energy into his tours, or *giras*, as they are called; but in a system that lacks meaningful elections, contact with the people has vital political purpose.

MEXICAN REVOLUTION

Modern Mexico was born under the sign of revolt. But the revolution which began in 1910 was, by no means, a social revolution. If it turned out that way after seven years of bloodshed, it was mainly through the efforts of new leaders like Emiliano Zapata, the "apostle" of peasant rights, and not through the efforts of the politicians who led it. To them, the revolution was fought to put an end to the corrupt regime of the aging Porfirio Díaz, but it meant no more than a change of guard. Francisco Madero, himself a member of the *hacendado*, or land-owning class, vacillated in the implementation of a land reform program that would favor the peasant class. He sympathized with Zapata's demands for a radical redistribution of the land but was slow in acceding to them. Madero was assassinated and became a martyr. His successor, Victoriano Huerta, made it clear that his government cared little or nothing for the poor and the landless.²

The social direction of the revolution was charted in the constitution of 1917.³ Since then, Mexico has evolved toward a system of government dominated by a single party, known at first as the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR), later as the *Partido Revolucionario Mexicano* (PRM) and, finally, as the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI). Self-

¹ *Latin America* (a weekly political and economic report), (London: Latin American Newsletter Ltd.), vol. 7, no. 31, August 3, 1973, p. 245. (All other references to this publication will be by volume, number, and date.)

² John Gerassi, *The Great Fear in Latin America* (New York: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 100–01.

³ The constitution of 1917 was considered to be one of the most advanced in the world. The four key articles of the charter were: *Article 3*, which guaranteed free public elementary education while at the same time reflecting the strong anticlerical biases of the revolution; *Article 27*, which vested the ownership of land and water in the state, providing the nation with absolute control over subsoil rights; *Article 123*, called the *magna carta* of Mexican labor, which gave workers the right to form unions, to collective bargaining, to a fixed working week, and to a minimum wage, also providing for a redistribution of the land among the peasants; and *Article 130*, which stripped the Church of its enormous powers. For a further discussion, see: Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 168–71; and Kenneth F. Johnson, *Mexican Democracy: A Critical View* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), pp. 26–7.

proliferating, and without serious political opposition,⁴ the ruling party has won every election for the presidency since it came into being in 1929. Its support has been drawn from a broadly based configuration of military, urban labor, peasants, and *caciques*, or state and local political bosses:

The military. The Mexican army has been very effective in giving strength and support to the PRI. Since the army controls the instruments of violence, it has been used by the government to cow the populace.⁵

In 1920, Alvaro Obregón was elected President and, in order to give the military a wide popular base, encouraged the formation of agrarian leagues (armed peasants who were loyal to the government and, as a result, were the beneficiaries of land expropriated from the *haciendas*). In 1934, after his election to the presidency, Lázaro Cárdenas commented, somewhat sadly, that "when the land belongs to the villages, the government will also belong to them, but . . . now the government depends upon the army."⁶ By this he meant that the Mexican government, controlled by his party, could maintain power only insofar as the army chieftains were kept happy, implying that any government which forgot this simple axiom would eventually disintegrate. Manuel Avila Camacho, his successor, in an attempt to divorce the military from politics, dropped it from the official party, thus depoliticizing the military bloc in Congress. After more than three decades, however, the army still functions as an internal police force.

Urban labor. Equally important in the perpetuation of single-party rule has been the highly organized and militant urban labor movement. The first labor union in Mexico was created by socialist Luis G. Morones in 1918, and became known as the *Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana* (CROM). Eighteen years later, another prominent socialist,

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, formed the *Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos* (CTM). Throughout the years, and with few exceptions, the PRI has tried to keep the CROM and the CTM content by complying with most of labor's demands. Cárdenas took credit for the controversial nationalization of the foreign-owned railroad and oil industry, but it was the labor unions and their spokesmen, Morones and Lombardo Toledano, who forced these measures upon the Mexican President. With the deaths of these two labor leaders, the unions have been increasingly controlled by the Mexican government, and have charted a more conservative course in line with the wishes of the PRI.

The peasant. Cárdenas was one of the few Presidents who enjoyed a wide base of popular support emanating from the peasant class. After distributing some 45 million acres of land to villages—twice as much as had been distributed before he came to power—Cárdenas founded the *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (CNC), a peasant union which received strong support from the CTM.⁷ The CNC was modelled after the agrarian leagues of Obregón, and became a strong supporter of the government. Those who did not join the CNC received very few benefits from Cárdenas and the party. More highly organized than the agrarian leagues, the CNC protected the rights of its members and systematized a rural militia, with a rural reserve force which was armed, drilled, and under direct orders of the zone commander.

The cacique. For quite a number of years, members of the national Congress have been selected by local or state *caciques*, who are supporters of the party and receive instructions from the higher echelon of the PRI. In a democracy, a national legislative body has the double task of expressing public opinion and censuring, when necessary, the actions of the executive branch of government. The Mexican Congress, controlled by party bosses who owe their positions to a complex system of patronage and not to the electorate, has failed in both functions. Moreover, it is servile, as it was under Porfirio Díaz, and highly ineffective.

The "glittering edifice" of the revolution, reflected in the unity of a single party, rests on these four pillars. Today, a system of linked privileges, extended by the PRI to the various interest groups that support it and immortalized by the name "revolution," is responsible for the stability and the continuity of the Mexican political apparatus.

Martin C. Needler has noted that three basic principles are accountable for "democracy" in Mexico: "cooption, balance, and the pendulum."⁸ Government policies have always sought to keep a middle ground when the interests of groups that support it have clashed in an attempt "to assure, if not maxi-

⁴ The conservative, Church-oriented, *Partido de Acción Nacional* (PAN), is the only party today that might be considered in opposition to the PRI. The PAN representation, however, has never posed a threat to the PRI or to the system. Two other minor parties to the Left of the PRI, the *Partido Socialista Popular* (PPS), and the *Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana* (PARM), supported the PRI candidate in the last presidential elections.

⁵ Two examples of the army's use of brutal force to uphold orders from the executive branch of government: in 1962, a peasant leader named Rubén Jaramillo was killed with his wife and three sons; in 1968, the army killed hundreds of students in Mexico City. Jaramillo's crime was that of having occupied land promised to him by President Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964) for which he had never received a title. The student revolt will be discussed later.

⁶ Lesley Byrd Simpson, *Many Mexicos* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1964), p. 296.

⁷ Lewis Hanke, *Mexico and the Caribbeans* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Press, 1959), p. 77.

⁸ For an elucidation of what "cooption, balance, and the pendulum" mean see: Martin C. Needler, "A Critical Time for Mexico," *Current History*, vol. 62, no. 366, February, 1972, pp. 82–83.

mun support from each group, at least minimum opposition."⁹ For example, even the most vociferous opponents of the government can be coopted into the system in exchange for patronage. When a Mexican President swings too much to the right, his successor will likely swing to the left, or take a middle course.

In a closed political system, the President is untouchable. The press may make much fuss about ministerial corruption, Communist subversion from within, and may charge that the *mordida*, a form of petty bribe, is used to coopt many political and governmental officials. But the President can be mentioned only in adulatory terms.¹⁰ No matter how banal the President's discourses are, he receives full coverage in the newspapers of the capital; his tours are reported in great detail; and his photos are posted everywhere. Although the powers within the PRI choose the next President, the outgoing chief of state has the final word in naming a successor. As the mordant writer Frank Brandenburg has stated:

Dictatorship of the Díaz variety has slowly given way to six-year authoritarianism of the Revolutionary variety. . . . Within the Mexican milieu, the political sun rises and sets every six years on the presidency. . . . Mexicans avoid personal dictatorships by retiring their dictators every six years.¹¹

It is against this background that we shall now discuss Echeverría's performance midway through his six-year term.

ECHEVERRÍA'S ADMINISTRATION

When Luis Echeverría was inaugurated President of Mexico in December, 1970, he pledged to maintain the vigorous pace of the country's economic development and to make his administration more responsive to the needs of the masses. Among the nation's priorities, he announced a full program of economic measures designed to stimulate rural and regional development. After more than three years in power, however, the apparent conflict between glamorous statistics and morbid reality still prevails. Mexico is potentially capable of feeding 200 million people, yet she can barely feed her 50 million population. The backward state of agriculture and the bureaucratic and political corruption that still exist are accountable, in part, for the fact that there are more than 15 million Mexicans who have never tasted milk and are considered undernourished.¹²

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹⁰ *Por Qué*, a weekly magazine which has dared to criticize the Mexican President, has been hard hit by the government's policy of not distributing newsprint to publications that commit such offenses.

¹¹ Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 141.

¹² Kenneth F. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

¹³ *Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 42, October 19, 1973, p. 329.

¹⁴ *Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 31, August 3, 1973, p. 245.

This situation has driven some young militants underground: terrorism, kidnappings, bank robberies, army ambushes, and student unrest have belied Mexico's image of stability in the last few years. To these young revolutionaries, Echeverría's intention to stress social justice even at the expense of economic growth is no more than a palliative that fails to deal with the basic ills of the country.

At the same time, Echeverría's huge wage increase of 33 percent to urban workers¹³ has infuriated the powerful private sector of the economy. Mexican businessmen believe the President is constricting both their profits and the nation's economic growth. Against these attacks from the left and the right, Echeverría has gone to the countryside to prove that his government does have popular support and that he is sincere in his attempt to eradicate social injustice.

As already mentioned, in 1973 inflation had reached an all-time high of 11 percent. While that figure compared well with most of Latin America, it was enough to create near panic in the commercial and industrial centers of Mexico. For 20 years Mexicans had taken pride in achieving rigorous control of inflationary trends in their country. Now, however, the government has been forced to put into effect an emergency anti-inflationary program.

Basically, the anti-inflationary steps taken by Echeverría can be described as follows: a) stricter controls over prices; b) redirection of public investments into short-term productive projects, especially in agriculture; c) increasing foreign exchange by expanding exports and reducing imports; d) a tighter grip on monetary policy, without going so far as to cause a credit squeeze that might endanger investments and production; and, e) controlling the foreign debt by seeking the most convenient loans from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to finance technically sound and financially proven investment programs.¹⁴

The measures adopted by Echeverría to control inflation have not been adequate and have been rejected by the left and the right. Echeverría's assurances to American, European and Japanese businessmen that his government did not have an "expropriation mentality" angered those on the left who, fearing more foreign investment, accused the President of "selling out." Relations with the private sector have deteriorated also as a result of government intervention in placing a ceiling on profits. The private sector has been upset particularly by the government's policy of assuming tighter controls of the booming private investment banks.

Unofficial estimates, which are probably more reliable than government figures, gloomily place the rate of inflation at 40 percent for 1974. But it would be wrong to put the blame solely on the Mexican

government for the current inflationary spiral. The immediate cause of Mexican inflation is external rather than internal. Economic difficulties in the United States have had an adverse effect on the Mexican economy. Tourism has declined and the devaluation of the dollar has weakened the purchasing power of the peso. United States President Richard Nixon's 10 percent surcharge on imported goods has been especially hard on Mexico since the United States is Mexico's biggest customer and supplier.¹⁵

Mexico's attempt to reduce the importation of wheat in 1974 also suffered a setback. The floods of 1973 caused agricultural production to drop considerably from that of the previous year, and the government has been forced to purchase grain abroad at a time when world prices for foodstuffs are soaring. Equally unfortunate for Mexico has been the failure of the petro-chemical industry to supply the domestic demand for petroleum. As a result, the government is importing oil when the energy crisis has suddenly burst upon the world.

There is little that a government can do when faced with "imported inflation," except, perhaps, to try to attain self-sufficiency in agricultural production. But to achieve this end would require far-reaching—and perhaps politically unfeasible—reforms in the country's agrarian structure. For example, under the agrarian reform program, small farmers occupy millions of acres of land that are relatively unproductive. Technical aid in irrigation, farm machinery and fertilizer are badly needed, but since the government's efforts are geared mainly toward industrialization, the small farmer is unlikely to receive aid to increase the productive potentiality of his *ejido*, or parcel of land.

Other structural sources of inflation, which the government is institutionally unable, or reluctant, to eradicate include tax evasion (endemic not only in Mexico but in the rest of Latin America) and bureaucratic and political corruption (lubricants without which the administrative machinery could not function). Echeverría has threatened harsh measures to put a stop to the *mordida*, and has used *provocateurs* to arrest corrupt officials soliciting bribes, but under the present system it is inconceivable to think that anything but small fish will be caught. Similarly, the

massive, and inflationary, corruption which accompanies the award of public work contracts is not likely to be reduced, let alone eliminated.¹⁶

During the Díaz Ordaz administration, Mexico borrowed heavily to finance major projects such as building rural roads and highways, large irrigation enterprises, hydroelectric power plants, and modernizing the railroads. While these public investments have been essential to sustain a rapid economic growth, they have, at the same time, caused the national debt to rise well above the \$3 billion mark.¹⁷

In seeking to control inflation without introducing needed structural reforms the Echeverría government and ensuing governments will inevitably be left at the mercy of international inflationary trends generated abroad. Should there occur a recession in the United States, for example, this would unquestionably lead to disastrous consequences for the Mexican economy.

UNIVERSITY UNREST

Although President Echeverría promised to ease tension between his administration and the universities when he assumed office, relations between the authorities and students have continued to be bitter. The police invasion of the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM) in August, 1973, awakened memories of the tragic events that led up to the Tlatelolco massacre in October, 1968, and marked another unpleasant chapter in the on-going struggle between the left and the right to control UNAM.¹⁸

Under the Echeverría administration, student unrest intensified in 1971 and in 1973. The key issues were university autonomy, the release of political prisoners taken into custody during the 1968 uprising, and control of the universities. The intervention of the armed forces and national police on the campus in both those years provoked resentment and opposition among the students, who remember the role that Echeverría played in suppressing—with great bloodshed—the demonstrations of 1968.¹⁹

During the first week of June, 1971, student demonstrations in Mexico City and Monterrey made it clear that Echeverría's conciliatory policies were not going to be accepted by student leaders. After the 1968 disturbances thousands of students had gone into exile or had been imprisoned by the Díaz Ordaz government. Echeverría had been slow in freeing the jailed. The student leaders demanded the release of all political prisoners, amnesty for themselves, government guarantees that the universities would remain autonomous, the dismissal of the chief of police in the Federal District, and the abolition of the riot squad.

In a peaceful protest march on June 10, from UNAM to the *zócalo*, the main plaza in Mexico City, 13 students were killed by a gang known as *los hal-*

¹⁵ Martin C. Needler, *op. cit.*, p. 84 (the U.S. supplies 66 percent of Mexico's imports and buys 62 percent of Mexico's exports).

¹⁶ *Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 31, August 3, 1973, p. 245.

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, "Mexico Turns Inward for Growth," January 25, 1971, p. 52C.

¹⁸ *Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 33, August 17, 1973, p. 257.

¹⁹ Luis Echeverría was Minister of the Interior when, on orders from Díaz Ordaz, he overreacted to a student protest movement which had gotten out of control because of poor handling by police. For a clear account of the incident, see John Womack, Jr., "Unfreedom in Mexico—Government Crackdown on the University," *The New Republic*, October 12, 1968, pp. 27–31.

cones (the hawks). The attackers, members of a rightist group, used machine guns and shot the students while the police watched without intervening. In a similar incident a week before, a dozen students were killed or wounded by another gang in Monterrey.

Echeverría, who was willing to talk to student leaders and to give in to some of their demands, was stunned and shaken. "The attack on the marchers . . . was clearly designed to force him either to go along with the repression . . . or else to resign."²⁰ What averted another crisis was the unanimous backing of the President by senior army officers, the resignations of the rectors of UNAM and the University of Nuevo León, in Monterrey, the dismissal of the chief of police in the Federal District, the government's release of all jailed students, and the return home of the exiles—most of whom had gone to Chile. The issue of autonomy was not clearly resolved, and the new rectors still had the power to call the police in case of emergency.

In August, 1973, the rector of UNAM, Guillermo Soberón, backed by right-wing elements, called in 1,000 policemen to quash a group of 50 armed students, all leftists, who had occupied one of the university's buildings. The rector justified his actions by saying that there had been a kidnapping attempt against a high official of his administration. But he also admitted that *porristas*, mercenary thugs who work for extremist groups on the left and right, were the assailants. Students protested the violation of campus immunity and called for more protest marches, which were quickly outlawed by the authorities.²¹

One of the unresolved problems of Mexican universities is that they are overcrowded and understaffed. As a result, UNAM has had to impose severe entry restrictions to its swollen campus.²² Such restrictions always cause trouble, and students tend either to submit or to rebel against what they consider an inimical authority. Yet, the universities are centers of debate and criticism and, as such, are a vital instrument in a political system that admits little opposition. Unfortunately, in Mexico "those who care most about order have crushed those who care most about freedom."²³

After more than three years in power, Echeverría has not been able to eradicate the climate of distrust and disruption that exists on the campus. In any

event, he wants to avoid at all costs another major confrontation with students, knowing that to permit more planned demonstrations may lead to another "massacre."

A CHANGING IMAGE

The changing image of the PRI is a result of Echeverría's attempt to abandon the rightist course set by his predecessor and obtain popular support for his controversial reformist policies. In the last congressional elections of July 1, 1973, the PRI won an overwhelming majority,²⁴ but the real loser was the old guard within the party. For candidates, Echeverría had chosen well-educated middle and lower-middle class young men, who campaigned on their own and were supporters of the President. The hardest blow in the elections was dealt to the conservative official trade union movement (CTM), which lost five key seats to PAN and PARM.²⁵

But if Echeverría achieved some success in altering the appearance of the party, he did little to reform its substance and even less to arouse any degree of popular enthusiasm. In fact, more than 40 percent of the registered voters (an estimated 25 million) did not cast their ballots. Moreover, since the presidency of Cárdenas, the PRI has ceased to be a popularly based movement and still depends heavily on wealthy industrialists and the propertied classes for support. It has not even been able to coopt the alienated left into submission; instead, it has suppressed it.

Since Mexican politicians do not compete publicly for the presidency, it is left to individual candidates to seek personal popularity. Because of his role in the 1968 student demonstrations, when Echeverría took office he was probably one of the most unpopular Presidents in recent years. In order to change this image, Echeverría has been spending an extraordinary amount of time touring the countryside.

By now, the President has become a familiar sight even in the most remote villages of the "interior,"

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Salvatore Bizzarro has made numerous trips to Mexico and to South America in the past ten years. He is the author of the *Historical Dictionary of Chile* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1972); has been a contributor to the *Hispanic American Report* (Stanford University); is on the editorial board of the *Latin American Yearly Review* (Paris, France) and has written a number of articles for scholarly journals. He is regional coordinator for Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Montana, and Idaho for the Emergency Committee to Aid Latin American Scholars (ECALAS—a committee of the Latin American Studies Association); and is presently working on a manuscript on the Chilean Nobel laureate Pablo Neruda, to be published in 1975.

²⁰ Martin C. Needler, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²¹ *Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 33, August 17, 1973, p. 257.

²² *Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 12, March 23, 1973, p. 95.

²³ John Womack, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 31.

²⁴ In the elections the PRI obtained almost 80 percent of the vote while the PAN increased its representation from 13.5 percent to 15.8 percent, making considerable gains in the conservative city of Puebla. PARM received 2 percent of the vote and the PPS failed to win representation in Congress.

²⁵ *Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 30, July 27, 1973, p. 239.

"There can be little doubt about the long-run viability of the Mexican economy. Its endowment of energy and other resources, its growing industrial sector, its skilled entrepreneurs, public and private, and its possibilities for large internal markets give it excellent prospects for growth."

Mexico in the World Economy

BY CALVIN P. BLAIR

Professor of Resources and International Business, University of Texas at Austin

WHEN LUIS ECHEVERRÍA ALVAREZ was sworn in as President of Mexico in December of 1970, he took over the leadership of one of the world's successful developing countries. He also assumed the political leadership of *La Revolución Mexicana*, a process of progressive change which each Mexican President is expected to continue in ways that promote both economic development and social justice, with respect for individual liberties and at least the formal structure of political democracy. He inherited the job at a difficult moment in history.

Mexico in 1970 was a large country. Her 2,000-square kilometer area (one-fifth the size of the United States) ranked her fourteenth in geographical size; her 50 million people (the size of France) ranked her fourteenth in population; and her Gross National Product of \$34 billion made her the world's sixteenth largest economy.

For three decades, the Mexican economy had kept real output growing at 6 or 7 percent per year, well ahead of Mexico's high population growth rate of 3 to 3.5 percent. The economy had undergone major structural transformation, taking on the characteristics of a reasonably advanced economy. Agriculture had declined in relative importance, and manufacturing had come to account for 23 percent of the Gross Domestic Product.¹ Modern facilities had developed, mostly in light manufactures (foods, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing, shoes, and paper) but also in iron and steel, petroleum, electrical energy, chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment.

Mexico's per capita Gross National Product of \$670 placed her far ahead of the underdeveloped countries, though well below the income levels of West Europe or the Soviet bloc, and somewhat below Argentina and Venezuela.

Mexican development had taken place overwhelm-

ingly through the use of national resources. Foreign capital had been marginal, though often strategic; and reliance on foreign technology had been heavy. A vigorous public sector had played a key development role, intervening in the economy in many ways, including the use of fiscal incentives and monetary policy, the ample provision of public credits, the protection of internal markets from import competition, and outright government ownership and operation of key industries which furnished inputs (e.g., energy and transport) at subsidized prices. Despite a good deal of "guidance" of the economy, there had been a heavy reliance on private initiative, an absence of centralized planning, and a generally tender concern for the prejudices of the private sector. Taxes on income from capital had been kept low, and the government had provided long periods of exchange-rate stability without exchange controls—conditions dear to private investment planners and borrowers across international boundaries.

Thirty years of development had nonetheless left Mexico with massive underemployment, strong pressures of population on the land, a poorly educated labor force, and an income distribution with inequalities typical of the world's most backward and underdeveloped nations. There had been persistent and growing deficits in the current account of the balance of payments, financed by a growing dependence on foreign direct investment and foreign public debt. Foreign firms had become conspicuously important in the export of manufactures, and Mexican firms had been paying large annual sums for the use of foreign technology, not always sure that the terms were favorable. The Mexican economy had become dependent on the United States in profound and intricate ways.

Given the realities of dependence, a Mexican President, if he is to survive politically, must take pains to develop policies independent of those of the United States. A good President, the Mexican saying goes, "*sabe llevarse bien con Estados Unidos sin agacharse*"—knows how to get along with the United States

¹ Gross Domestic Product is the market value of all goods and services produced in Mexico in one year. Subtracting the net payments which Mexico makes to foreign capital and labor gives the Gross National Product.

without subservience. Luis Echeverría was certainly determined to be such a President.

Dissatisfaction with the distribution of the fruits of development had led to open debate about policy and to serious forms of social protest, including violence. Echeverría was faced with the task of giving new directions to development policy. He would soon be faced also with a set of short-run problems common to all countries: inflation, instability in the international monetary system, and shortages of energy and raw materials.

INITIATIVE AND CONSTRAINT

Echeverría is an activist President who chose as his general policy objective to "reorient" development strategy to correct some of the more serious defects of the system. This meant efforts to redistribute income in favor of the masses, to raise productivity in the backward sector of agriculture, to decentralize industry and absorb more labor, to reduce balance of payments deficits and public foreign debt, and to control access to foreign investment and technology.

He has pursued this difficult set of policy measures on four levels. The first is hortatory: he has used his indefatigable energy and his considerable oratorical skill to meet with anybody and everybody, breathing "revolutionary zeal," urging everyone to a new sense of "nationalism" and "patriotism" and to high levels of hard work and self-sacrifice. The second level is legislative: new laws and amendments have created agencies, funds, commissions, and programs. The third level is budgetary: large increases in public expenditures have been accompanied by reallocations to the favored sectors, especially agriculture and workers' housing. The fourth level is administrative: the public sector has put new emphasis on administrative reform and efficient operations.

As Echeverría knew, keeping the support of the private sector constrains a President's choices of income redistribution instruments. As he also knew, redistributive measures are best carried out with a growing total product. And as he would quickly learn, the pressures of short-run policy requirements for 1971-1973 could obscure or frustrate temporarily the objectives of structural reform.

GROWTH AND STABILITY

Echeverría inherited an economy which had enjoyed 15 years of sustained growth with relative price stability, and he did not want to abandon the stability objective. When inflationary pressures reappeared in late 1970, he was convinced that he needed to "apply the brakes." In 1971, government expenditures were reduced sharply from levels which normally would have been budgeted, and growth in the money supply was restricted well below earlier expansion rates. The results were dramatic. Inflation was controlled

to about 5 percent, and the balance of payments deficit was reduced. But Mexico suffered a "growth recession." Gross Domestic Product increased just 3.7 percent in real terms, barely more than the population increase.

No such drastic contraction had been expected from orthodox fiscal and monetary measures. The results of his first year in office must have come as a shock to the President. Stability had been achieved at a high and unintended social cost which could scarcely be tolerated for long.

An expansionary policy was adopted for 1972. Expenditures by the federal government and the state enterprises under its control were increased 27 percent over their 1971 levels, with large increases for investments and subsidies; and the money supply expanded by 20 percent. The policy worked well. Real Gross Domestic Product grew 7.3 percent, and inflation was held to 5.5 percent, an excellent performance by world standards. Mexico had momentarily recaptured growth with stability. But the objective was achieved at the cost of a rising balance of payments deficit, an increase in public foreign debt, and a sharp rise in the burden of debt service. Some inflationary pressures were created, and they would return to accentuate matters in the extraordinarily unstable year to come, 1973.

The world economy in 1973 developed profound economic and financial strains. The dollar was devalued for the second time in 14 months; floating exchange rates were adopted for major currencies; an energy crisis became acute; shortages appeared in foodstuffs and raw materials; high levels of industrial output generated excess demand; interest rates rose to unprecedented heights; speculative movements of short-term funds occurred on a grand scale; and world prices accelerated at the highest rates in a quarter of a century. Crop failures occurred all over the world, and the condition was especially acute in Mexico. External inflationary pressures were intensified by internal pressures in a process in which it was impossible to separate cause and effect.

Expenditures by the federal government and its enterprises increased 38 percent over their 1972 level, government borrowing grew rapidly, and public foreign debt increased by 40 percent. Despite an impressive increase of 25 percent in exports, imports expanded by more than one-third, and Mexico's current account deficit rose to the historic high of \$1.3 billion. The money supply expanded by 24 percent. Although real Gross Domestic Product grew by 7.3 percent, inflation was rampant: wholesale prices increased by 25 percent and consumer prices by 22 percent.

Mounting inflation and uncertainty intensified economic and political tensions. The government granted an 18 percent increase in minimum wages

and a 30 percent increase in the support prices of corn and beans, in efforts to protect the income of at least some major groups. In a decision to eliminate future deficits of key government enterprises, prices were raised for electricity and petroleum products.

In the conservative wing of the private sector, criticism of the President mounted. There were even rumors of stirrings in the army. Echeverría's advocates found it propitious to publish newspaper statements in favor of his policies and to muster political demonstrations of support. The President himself reached an "accord" with the private sector, and their fears appear to have been laid to rest for the moment. His promise of no new taxes appealed to private business, and the handsome profits reaped in 1973 could not have hurt "business confidence."

To defend the peso from the effects of a large outflow of short-term funds, the government raised interest rates and borrowed heavily, so that the central bank was actually able to increase its international reserves by \$120 million during the year. The government also arranged a standby credit of \$500 million with a consortium of private banks and renewed its standby credit lines with the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Together with reserves, the credits brought the total foreign exchange at the disposition of the Mexican government to \$2.7 billion at the end of 1973, an amount which should forestall fears of devaluation in the near future.

The net results of 1973 favored business profits over labor income. Corn and bean farmers and organized labor groups were protected somewhat from the full impact of inflation; but the money incomes of the masses of unorganized and low-income city dwellers could not possibly have kept pace with the rise in consumer prices.

However unfortunate or undesired the income redistribution effects, the events of 1973 caused Echeverría to announce an austerity program for 1974. Public sector expenditures will increase by only 14 percent. Except for the budget, no formal targets have been announced; but government and private sector economists alike seem to expect real Gross Domestic Product to grow at the tolerable "anti-inflationary" rate of about 5 percent, and inflation may be held to 10 or 15 percent.

DEVELOPMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION

Echeverría's development and redistribution measures have given considerable attention to low-income farmers. He has interpreted agrarian reform to mean the provision of employment in rural areas. Legislation has favored the development of the *ejidos*² and the consolidation of small farms into cooperatives

² *Ejidos* are communal village lands, sometimes worked collectively and sometimes as individual parcels.

or other production units. The government has provided credits and guarantees, a program of rural industries, and a direct employment scheme using labor-intensive methods to build roads, schools, and irrigation works. Attempts to decentralize industry by means of industrial parks, government credits, and tax concessions are seen as adjuncts to the rural employment program.

A significant but small dent has been made in underemployment. But some four million agricultural workers will probably have to find work. Based on recent experiences, they could easily require more than \$10 billion of government investment in rural industries.

In its traditional fields, the Mexican government has continued an active program of investment in roads, railways, and ports. The budget for education has doubled since 1970, and President Echeverría has urged a restructuring of programs to fit employment demands. His administration has emphasized technical schools, including agricultural high schools; and it has created the new *Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana* in Mexico City.

Government enterprises in petroleum, electricity, and steel continue to get large shares of the public budget, and the government continues to operate some 585 enterprises of all types. As part of its administrative reforms, the government has indicated it might weed out or reorganize some weak firms, but there is no intention to back away from the direct and active productive role of the state—and certainly no intent to sell public firms to private investors, as the government is frequently requested to do by conservative spokesmen for the business sector.

FISCAL REFORM

Serious students of the Mexican fiscal system, both national and foreign, have urged that a more progressive tax system is an ultimate necessity. But the President must play a complex game, part of which is to stimulate the private sector. Echeverría has chosen not to increase tax rates (except for an increase in the transactions tax at the beginning of 1973), but to stress a fiscal reform which is administrative in nature, tightening up on both the federal budget procedures and the collection of taxes now evaded. More efficient collection of income taxes

(Continued on page 224)

Calvin P. Blair has lived and worked in Mexico for various periods of time over the past 20 years, and has been a visiting professor in three Mexican universities. He is the author of "Nacional Financiera: Entrepreneurship in a Mixed Economy," in Raymond Vernon (ed.), *Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

"Mexican policy makers seem to have found a tolerable middle road in view of the rhetorical demands of the system's revolutionary background, the realities of United States power, and the need to industrialize Mexico at any cost. But there is no reason to accept the Mexican leadership's claim that Mexico pursues or is in a position to pursue an independent foreign policy."

Mexico's Foreign Policy: Disguised Dependency

BY CARLOS A. ASTIZ

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OF THE BASIC ELEMENTS of a nation's foreign policy outlined by Hans Morgenthau,¹ none has been more influential in the case of Mexico than her geographic location. The Mexican *caudillo* Porfirio Díaz said it in two sentences: "Poor Mexico. So far away from God and so near the United States." Considering natural resources, population, territory, and current level of industrial development, it could be speculated that Mexico's large common border with one of the two superpowers has been a key factor in discouraging a greater international role. At the same time, Mexico's southern neighbors are so weak that they constitute no threat to her security. Furthermore, because of the influence exercised by the United States in Central America, Mexico's relations with the United States serve to stabilize the southern as well as the northern border.

It should be briefly emphasized that the present Mexican political system is the product of the first true Latin American revolution. After a period of upheaval and drastic changes that lasted until 1940, a new ruling elite of Institutional Revolutionary party

(PRI) bureaucrats, government officials, businessmen and industrialists has been dedicated to the nation's industrialization and political stabilization.² Because these objectives seem to enjoy widespread support, foreign policy received and still receives very low priority, with the possible exception of relations with the United States, which are often conducted at the highest levels through governmental and non-governmental contacts. In a survey of a representative urban population sample conducted some years ago only 1.2 percent identified foreign affairs as one of the two most important problems facing Mexico; only 3.2 percent of the sample identified topics related to international politics as being among the goals of the Mexican revolution.³ Thus, the Mexican ruling elite was not alone in paying little attention to international politics and subjecting foreign policy to internal goals. This decision, it should be emphasized, contributed to the removal of the armed forces as an autonomous power factor and made it possible for the civilian leadership to maintain military expenditures at a level under 10 percent of the federal budget.

Since international affairs are given a low priority within the Mexican political system and since the country has shown no territorial or diplomatic ambitions, it is not surprising that Mexican diplomats often take refuge in legalistic postures. In so doing, they have made some interesting contributions to international and inter-American law. In the 1960's and 1970's, Presidents López Mateos and Luis Echeverría Álvarez tried to deviate from this self-imposed diplomatic isolation. The former traveled to a number of Latin American and European countries and supported the formation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA); the latter has recently

¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3d edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), chapter 9.

² Naturally, they have also been dedicated to the pursuance of their personal interests.

³ The survey referred to here is *The Five Nation Study*, prepared by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, and available on computer tape from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Some of the data was originally published in Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963). While I have some doubts about the accuracy and validity of the Mexican survey, the questions dealing with foreign policy appear reliable for the purpose of this article.

made a number of trips to Europe and Asia, including the People's Republic of China.⁴ As of this writing, however, the results do not appear to be impressive.

Legalistic pronouncements, profound as they may be, do not replace power, least of all in international politics. In the case of Mexico this is particularly true, owing to her special relationship with the United States, which possesses a monopoly of power in the Americas. Thus, Mexican legalistic opposition failed to prevent the regional superpower and the other large countries of Latin America from suspending Cuba from membership in the Inter-American system and from organizing an Inter-American Military Force which occupied the Dominican Republic in 1965. In fact, on the question of relations with Cuba, Mexico's position is more ambiguous than would appear at first sight, as it shall be seen. Nevertheless, Mexico's initiative in converting Latin America into a nuclear-weapons-free area (which materialized in the treaty of Tlatelolco) and her support of regional disarmament schemes cannot be ignored.⁵

The international objectives of Mexico's ruling elite, at least since 1940, have been to convey the image of an internally and externally peaceful nation, constantly moving toward greater equality, and prepared to conduct relations with any country that had an interest in doing the same. Often Mexico's foreign policy pronouncements sounded moralistic, as if she were the conscience of Latin America. While the pronouncements were addressed to the universe, the image was directed toward the centers of international capital which could contribute to Mexico's industrialization, as well as to the well-being of the ruling elite and the nation at large.

There is ample evidence that the international objectives of Mexico's rulers have been achieved. Since 1955 and with the exception of the year 1960 (this matter will be discussed later) Mexico has received direct foreign investments of more than \$100 million per year; in 1965, foreign investments exceeded \$200 million.⁶ Of the 400 largest corporations operating in Mexico, more than half are in reality owned or heavily influenced by non-Mexican interests, in spite of the provisions of Mexican law. Approximately three-fourths of all foreign investments in recent years have come from the United States, while approximately

60 percent of Mexican imports and exports come from or go to the American market. Tourism, essentially from the United States, has grown constantly and currently contributes more than \$500 million to the Mexican economy. Tourism and foreign capital, in turn, are extremely important for Mexico's internal stability, since the country has found it necessary to run a constant deficit in its international balance of trade.

Although foreign policy is not an important element in the life of the average Mexican, the ruling elite has used certain foreign policy issues to project a given internal image and to reinforce whatever legitimacy it derives as the heir of the Mexican revolution. This internal image usually contains the claim that Mexico is led by a profoundly nationalist elite pursuing an autonomous foreign policy, which in view of the country's history means autonomous from the United States; it also contains the claim that no outside power influences domestic policy decisions. The most important task of Mexican policy makers in the last decades has been to solve the problems which arise when the external image, particularly the close relationship with the United States, has contradicted the internal image. Two examples will illustrate the skill with which this task has been carried out.

RELATIONS WITH CASTRO'S CUBA

The victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba struck a responsive cord throughout Latin America. The Mexicans, remembering the ideals of the Mexican revolution, welcomed the popular Cuban leader with his nationalistic pronouncements in a nation that had been first a *de jure* and more recently a *de facto* colony of the United States. Once the relations between the Castro regime and the United States deteriorated, and the latter demanded "hemispheric solidarity" against Castro, Mexico's position became extremely difficult. As it has been intimated above, the difficulties were caused not in the inter-American arena but within the Mexican polity. Foreign policy alternatives on the Cuban issue became rallying causes for the differing groups that wished to steer the López Mateos administration then governing Mexico. Left-of-center groups were unhappy with what they considered "the death of the Mexican revolution" and the freezing of the new status quo by the Mexican version of "the new class";⁷ to these groups, close relations with and support for the reformist regime in control of Cuba would reflect a desire for reform on the part of López Mateos and a reaction against American influence in Mexico.

Right-of-center organizations, on the other hand, were suspicious of López Mateos's seemingly populist preferences and his avowed desire to increase the tempo of internal redistribution of socio-economic rewards; they felt that Mexican support of the Castro

⁴ For a description of a recent Echeverría trip around the world, see *Latin America*, March 30, 1973, p. 97.

⁵ For an early report of Mexico's efforts in this matter, see *The New York Times*, April 17, 1966, p. 33. It should be indicated that Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina have not yet fully subscribed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

⁶ See David Ibarra and others, *El Perfil de México en 1980*, vol. 1 (Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1970), pp. 174-5.

⁷ The term was coined by the Yugoslavian political writer, Milovan Djilas, with reference to the established Communist leadership.

regime would interfere with their close economic ties with the United States and would diminish the attractiveness of Mexico in the eyes of foreign investors. The fact that Lázaro Cárdenas, the last of the reformist Presidents of Mexico and the acknowledged leader of the left wing of the ruling party, was a strong Castro supporter intensified the concern of the right.

Early in 1960, as the conflict between the United States and Cuba intensified, López Mateos visited a number of Latin American countries, where he was constantly questioned about Mexico's position in relation to the feud between the United States and Cuba. His answers reflected general sympathy toward Castro's reforms, coupled with the reminder that similar reforms had been carried out in his country much earlier. He also emphasized Mexico's position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the right of each nation to solve its problems as it saw fit. Since Mexico faced a series of openly articulated demands by middle-class and lower-class organizations for a greater share of the national pie, this benevolent attitude was not received too well by the defenders of the status quo. His previous remark that "the real problem of Mexico and the countries of Latin America was the United States" had not been reassuring to American business interests and government circles.⁸ For the left, the Castro regime and Mexico's relations toward it became a convenient excuse to mobilize support to challenge the internal status quo; for the right, Cuba was an issue with which it could test and, if necessary, challenge the populist inclinations of the López Mateos administration.

During the second half of 1960 and throughout 1961 both wings mobilized their followers. The left demanded that López Mateos support Castro's revolution, considered to be similar to Mexico's revolution, whose reactivation it also requested; its supporters included university students, intellectuals, and certain middle-class and lower-class organizations, as well as the minute left-wing parties. The right warned López Mateos of the dangers and possible consequences of lending any support to what it considered a Communist government; its supporters were the major business and industrial organizations (the Confederation of Chambers of Industry and the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce), as well as certain members of the Catholic Church hierarchy. Both

sides organized large meetings and demonstrations and, for the first time in a number of years, a foreign policy decision became a matter of public controversy.

As it turned out, the economic situation of Mexico, internally and in relation with the United States, precipitated a settlement of the controversy. The growth rate of the Mexican economy had been diminishing since approximately 1955. While the average yearly rate for the 1950's had been 2.8 percent, the rate for the period 1960-1962 was only 0.8 percent per year. In 1960, domestic capital investment almost came to a halt, and there was a negative sign in the category of direct foreign investments (a drastic change in the pattern mentioned earlier) that was reflected in a foreign *disinvestment* of \$116.5 million.⁹ The economic slowdown affected the pocketbooks of many Mexicans, who demanded a solution. The López Mateos administration decided to compensate for the investment behavior of the private sector by increasing the role of the public sector; such a policy, however, required outside credits which, in reality, could only come from the United States, or from international agencies in which the United States played a decisive role.

The causes of the economic slowdown are unquestionably many, but right-wing groups opposed to López Mateos's populism and to his policy toward Cuba indicated that the private sector was having second thoughts regarding Mexico's reliability. It was reported that American tourists were canceling hotel reservations by the thousands, and the United States Department of State leaked its displeasure at certain pronouncements of the Mexican government. In its economic report on Mexico, *The New York Times* identified as one cause of the economic slowdown certain pro-Cuba statements, which it called "something of a blockbuster."¹⁰ A Mexican researcher who has studied these events places the problem in its proper context:

One of the most interesting questions for the observer of international politics is to determine what limitations to the foreign policies of the underdeveloped countries are imposed by their economic vulnerability. The question is pertinent in the Mexican case, since its economic development would be seriously affected if a conflict were to develop with American investors and the United States government. . . . The American influence in Mexican economic activities has enough strength to seriously doubt the idea of a Mexican administration capable of acting in a totally independent manner in the international arena.¹¹

Mexico continued her autonomous international course toward Cuba until the end of 1961. Internally, however, the presence and the possible "demonstration effect" of the Castro regime were being neutralized by mid-1961. At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Organization of American States, held in Punta del Este in January, 1962, to resolve the

⁸ *The New York Times*, October 13, 1959, p. 12. For a comprehensive treatment of these events, see Olga Pellicer de Brody, *México y la Revolución Cubana* (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 1972) and Arthur K. Smith, Jr., "Mexico and the Cuban Revolution: Foreign Policy-Making in Mexico under President Adolfo López Mateos (1958-64)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1970).

⁹ Ibarra and others, *El Perfil*, pp. 174-75.

¹⁰ In its issue of January 11, 1961, p. 1.

¹¹ Pellicer de Brody, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

continuation of Cuba's participation in the inter-American system, the Mexican Foreign Minister altered his stance. He actually introduced the thesis that a Marxist-Leninist regime, such as the one governing Cuba, was incompatible with participation in the OAS, although he argued that the OAS Charter did not contain a mechanism to solve the problem. The incompatibility thesis was promptly accepted by a majority of the countries represented, the procedural objections of the Mexican representative were overruled, and the Castro regime was suspended from membership. Mexico voted against this decision on procedural grounds, having introduced the reasoning adopted by the majority to approve the measure.

Thus the Mexican government was able to point out that it had not supported the anti-Castro decision. The industrial and business groups that had opposed the López Mateos administration on Cuba hailed the Mexican position. Later, when Mexico decided to continue diplomatic relations with Cuba, these groups indicated their sympathy with the government's decision. The United States Department of State made clear that such a decision did not affect the good relations between the two countries. The Cuban presence in Mexico was reduced to the minimum compatible with diplomatic usage, and left-of-center groups that had demanded support for the Castro regime melted away. International credits were obtained; American investment continued its growth; and private investments returned to their normal pattern. The dilemma had been solved.

THE ROLE OF AMERICAN TOURISM

Tourism has been an extremely important element in Mexican politics; and in Mexico tourism means American tourism since this makes up more than 90 percent of the total. Any other source is not considered very important by those who benefit from it. The international routes actually flown by Mexican airlines (*Aero-Mexico* and *Mexicana de Aviación*) are concentrated almost exclusively on their northern neighbors, the United States and, to a lesser degree, Canada. They do not fly south of Mexico, surrendering (without apparent damage) those routes to United States, Canadian, Argentine, Brazilian, and other airlines. Mexican airlines, like other sectors of the tourist industry, concentrate on attracting the American tourist, who seems to have an interest in Mexico and the money to spend there.

Tourism has created employment for many of those who cannot be absorbed by Mexico's growing industrial sector (and they are many, owing to Mexico's

high population growth rate) and who are not predisposed to remain on the farm or return to it. Furthermore, Mexicans and foreign investors have invested heavily in hotels and other tourist facilities. It is no secret that well-known political leaders, like former President Miguel Alemán and General and former Governor Marcelino García Barragán, have invested heavily in resort properties along the Pacific coast. The cities and towns along the United States border, of which Tijuana is perhaps the best known, survive in their present form thanks to American short-term tourism. Thus, a significant sector of Mexican business and key members of the political elite have a direct interest in the continuing inflow of American tourists.

It would not be very useful in this brief outline of Mexican foreign policy to analyze whether it is in the "national interest" of Mexico for the tourist trade to continue in its present form. It is important that many of Mexico's ruling elite know that it is in their interest and also probably believe that it is in the nation's interest. It should also be remembered that international tourist trade in the volume discussed here becomes a meaningful political weapon. The events which took place in the second half of 1969 support this contention and confirm the level of Mexican dependence vis-à-vis her neighbor to the north.

During 1969, the administration of Richard Nixon, trying to move decisively to solve the drug problem in the United States, concluded that a large portion of the drugs consumed in the United States were being smuggled from Mexico. The United States government approached its Mexican counterpart to obtain assistance in eliminating such traffic. It soon became apparent that some local and perhaps some state party bureaucrats and government officials were benefiting from the drug traffic and were not about to cut this source of income.¹² After friendly persuasion failed to prod the Mexican authorities into action, the United States government decided to search thoroughly all those entering the country from Mexico. All indications were that the amount of drugs being smuggled by those crossing legally was minimal; thus, the real goal of this action was to slow down border-crossing formalities and, consequently, to discourage

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¹² The reader should be reminded of the high level of corruption throughout Mexico's public administration; positions are given to the highest bidders or to those willing to invest in them. Public arguments over the amount of bribes are not uncommon.

MEXICO UNDER ECHEVERRÍA

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where huge crowds gather to touch him or to catch a glimpse of their leader. In a system that lacks meaningful elections, and does not permit a President to be reelected, it is ironic to see Echeverría acting as if he were seeking public office again. Those who back him see these *giras* as his attempt to show the people that the government cares about their problems. Those who oppose him, on the other hand, dismiss the crowds as gatherings that are pre-staged by government officials, who use party trucks to bring out a great number of people for these occasions.

The critics may be right. But more important, the *giras* allow the people to make their President aware of their grievances and petitions. Although Echeverría seldom takes action on these petitions and complaints he hears on his tours, he promises to study them, relegating his recommendations to his aides. Occasionally the President grants a request immediately, as happened in Tijuana where high school students asked for the construction of a new building and for the federalization of their school. Echeverría listened and pronounced: "From this day on, the Lázaro Cárdenas High School is fully federalized."²⁶ As might be expected, not all the demands are met. If they were, the only way to govern would be for the President to rush to the countryside making decisions on the spot, a haphazard way for any government to conduct its affairs. But announcements like the one made in Tijuana reflect good staging on the part of Echeverría and are always positively construed.²⁷

The President's trips raise more questions than they resolve. They indicate that the Mexican bureaucracy itself has failed to understand the needs of the people, and that Echeverría has been unable to deal with the real problems that face the country. Can the President, by himself, actually respond to the requests of millions of Mexicans? He certainly cannot eliminate inflation by a show of concern on a *gira*. The enactment of the laws he proposes is far more important than what he promises to high school students or to small farmers. Meeting with student leaders can resolve day-to-day conflicts between the administration and the university, but it cannot eliminate the greater problem that confronts the National University, built 25 years ago to accommodate 25,000 students and with an enrollment of 80,000 in 1974. Strained relations with the private sector of the economy can hardly be eased by the President's trips to the "interior," and an alienated left cannot be co-

opted into a system that constantly attempts to suppress it.

These are uncertain times for Mexico. Structural changes on both social and economic fronts are badly needed. With these tours, the President may achieve a change of image. He is, in fact, much more popular today than any other President since Cárdenas. But his expressed wish to stress social justice cannot become reality unless he effectively broadens the power base of his party and his government.

MEXICO IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

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alone could raise revenues in amounts equal to 10 percent of present federal spending.

As a corollary of fiscal reform, the prices of public services will be raised to cover costs; and the state-owned petroleum and electricity companies will be expected to collect enough revenues to help finance capital expansions as well. The private business sector has applauded, in theory, the government's fiscal reforms. It remains to be seen whether paying all the taxes owed or paying higher prices for energy, transport, and water will be popular.

CONTROLLING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

To deal with the abiding questions of foreign investment and technology, Mexico under Echeverría has passed two closely related laws: the Law on the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks, and the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment. Together, they create a National Technology Registry with controls over the terms on which Mexican firms can purchase know-how, a National Registry of Foreign Investments, and a National Commission on Foreign Investment whose function is to screen and control. The investment law also extends to industry in general the principle of majority Mexican ownership, with exceptions allowed to benefit the Mexican economy. The government is thus moving toward more "Mexicanization" and to a more detailed and more technical negotiation of terms with foreign firms. In characteristic fashion, the Mexican regime proposes to be "flexible"; and a joint committee of Mexican and foreign businessmen has been appointed to encourage foreigners to seek out opportunities under the new laws.

VIABILITY OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMY

There can be little doubt about the long-run viability of the Mexican economy. Its endowment of energy and other resources, its growing industrial sector, its skilled entrepreneurs, public and private,

²⁶ *Los Angeles Times*, "Mexican President Reaches Out to the People," January 7, 1974, part 1, p. 19.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

and its possibilities for large internal markets give it excellent prospects for growth. Government ownership and control of energy supplies, together with participation in joint public-private oligopolies in key industries represent something of a substitute for an economic planning mechanism. Extensive contact between public officials and private businessmen allow for much pressuring, informing, and reacting. Strong interests representing labor or skilled technocrats in government can muster countervailing power. And even an activist President bent on income redistribution is constrained by the factors of "business confidence" and possible flights of capital.

President Echeverría's redistribution objectives are being pursued by measures to which few could object. Low-income farmers really do need help; the best *ejidos* can be made highly productive; and small farms need consolidation. Everyone favors, in theory, some move away from industrial overcrowding. But the chosen policy instruments can work only over time. Relative income shares may not change at all; but if absolute income is raised substantially among marginal groups, redistribution may be postponable.

Reducing external dependence is a long-term process, too. The stimuli of the United States economy are too attractive to dismiss, though some diversification of supplies and markets is desirable and will probably occur. Despite very successful efforts to promote exports, the Mexican economy has become very import-sensitive; trade deficits are likely to continue, and foreign debt will probably rise. Some refinancing to restructure debt maturities will surely take place. Mexican skills at adapting and creating technology are growing, but that is a long process.

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MEXICO'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Americans from going to Mexico, at least for short periods of time.

The procedure worked out exactly as expected. Long lines were formed by those trying to enter the United States at the border, and people had to wait for hours. Naturally, Americans planning to drive to Mexico for a day or a weekend did not want to spend most of their time on line to reenter the United States; thus they went somewhere else. Mexicans who pro-

vide services to tourists were immediately affected; through formal and informal political channels, they pressured the national governments to settle the matter. Within a short time the Díaz Ordaz administration resumed negotiations with the United States and proceeded to hamper the activities of drug producers, processors, and smugglers with apparent effectiveness.¹³ In any case, shortly thereafter the Nixon administration emphasized the understanding and collaboration of the Mexican government; thorough searches of all those entering the United States from Mexico were suspended.

In practical terms, this episode provided further evidence of Mexico's dependency on the United States and her inability, under existing conditions, to face up to economic pressures from the United States. A secondary but no less important lesson from this episode is the clear perception that United States policy makers had of the role played by the appearance of autonomy in Mexican foreign policy. With the negotiations completed and the Mexican government doing what the United States wanted it to do, American policy makers refrained from giving the impression that they had put pressure on the Mexicans or that the Mexicans had agreed to take politically distasteful measures. This American restraint allowed the Mexican leadership to claim domestically that Mexico had "once more" dealt as an equal with the United States and that Mexico had been fully consulted and given an opportunity to participate in decisions which would affect both countries. The interest groups that had been affected by the drop in American tourism were satisfied with the results and were willing to let the government claim whatever it wanted. And the average Mexican (assuming that he exists) was reinforced in his belief that the heirs of the Mexican revolution had once again protected Mexican sovereignty from United States encroachment.

Once the facts are known, it would be very easy to become critical of the real foreign policy of Mexico, as some Mexican and many Latin Americans have been.¹⁴ Mexican policy makers seem to have found a tolerable middle road in view of the rhetorical demands of the system's revolutionary background, the realities of United States power, and the need to industrialize Mexico at any cost. But there is no reason to accept the Mexican leadership's claim that Mexico pursues or is in a position to pursue an independent foreign policy. A drastic change in the overall direction of Mexican foreign policy can come about only as the by-product of an internal redistribution of power or a profound change in the ruling elite's outlook and objectives. Whether any such changes would be acceptable to the United States is an open question.

¹³ These efforts were widely publicized in the Mexican press. See, for instance, *El Universal*, November 27, 1969, p. 7, and December 4, 1969, p. 1. For a particularly strong statement by a Mexican official, see *Excelsior*, December 21, 1969, p. 1-D. *The New York Times* confirmed the Mexican cooperation on March 28, 1971.

¹⁴ For an example of Mexican criticism, see Jorge Carrión, "Retablo de la Política 'a la Mexicana,'" in Fernando Carmona and others, *El Milagro Mexicano*, 3d edition (Mexico: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1973), pp. 164-247.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

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teaching a larger number of pupils. The public at large seems to be content: more and more children are attending school.

However, the millennium is not yet. Despite increases in enrollment, 25 percent of the school-aged population is not receiving any instruction at all. Despite attempts to establish a free breakfast program, 51 percent of the total population suffers from nutritional deficiencies. Despite the massive literacy campaigns, 23.8 percent of the population is officially illiterate; the figure is probably higher. But the figures and statistics released by the government for the 1974 budget for the Secretariat of Education are impressive: while the budget for 1973 amounted to Mex\$15,112,492,000, the SEP has been allotted Mex\$19,113,240,000 for 1974, an increase of 26.5 percent. The federal expenditure for education amounts to approximately 30 percent of the budget destined to federal agencies. This, no doubt, is remarkable. But if the budget for education is computed on the basis of total government expenditures, the percentage drops dramatically to 16.3 percent for the 1973 fiscal year. Let us also bear in mind that the total expenditure budget increases substantially each year—33.8 percent in 1973—at times the increase being greater than the percentage increase allocated to education.¹¹

The Secretary of Education, Victor Bravo Ahuja, while discussing the achievements of his tenure, also announced a series of reforms for 1974 which are probably indicative of the future direction of Mexican education, including: the construction of 7,417 new classrooms; the creation of 13,000 teaching posts for elementary education teachers; the founding of the College of Baccalaureates (*Colegio de Bachilleres*) at the pre-university level to relieve the pressure on the National Preparatory School System; increased support to regional universities; increased support to the National Autonomous University of Mexico (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México*, UNAM) in Mexico City; the founding of the Metropolitan University of Mexico City (*Universidad Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México*).

These announcements indicate a continuing, concerted effort to bring all Mexican children to the classroom; continuation of the literacy campaign; and further experimentation in educational methodology. But they also indicate further broadening of the Mexican concept of centralized control of education as a

means of molding national character. Federal participation in higher education has become an accepted fact, a change of great importance, given the Latin tradition of university autonomy.

The creation of a new and huge university in Mexico City, whose functionaries come for the most part from the government, has given rise to the common belief that it is being founded to divide—geographically as well as ideologically—the highly flammable Mexican student body that has erupted violently and regularly since the Massacre of Tlatelolco in 1968. On the other hand, one might argue that the establishment of the new institution, together with substantial support to the state university, constitute the salvation for the hopelessly overcrowded and perennially strike-plagued National University in Mexico City. Nevertheless, one must remember that by law the federal government does not control the university system. The Organic Law of Education applies to the lower educational levels, but does not include most universities, which operate and are regulated by special statutes passed by the federal Congress and by the state legislatures in the case of regional institutes. Most financial support, however—and this fact makes other considerations superfluous—comes from the federal and state governments.

CONCLUSION

In summary, any evaluation of the Secretariat of Education's current activities must take into account the formidable geographic, social and linguistic problems of modern Mexico. These problems, so alien as to be almost incomprehensible to the American public, include staggering population growth; severe inequities in the distribution of wealth manifest in rigid social division; the almost total isolation of much of the rural population; an urban poor living in such squalid conditions that education almost seems a low-priority item; a sizable Indian population speaking dozens of mutually unintelligible languages. In 1972–1973 I was involved in the education of Indians in the state of Oaxaca and was made painfully aware that any educational theory must be adapted to the reality of Mexican life. One can only applaud the SEP for remaining deeply concerned with the most innovative educational techniques while confronting problems of such magnitude.

On the other hand, the possibility of total government domination of national life is built into the present structure and activities of the Secretariat of Education, which could become another way to insure the perpetual triumph of the PRI. Does the traditionally Mexican view of the inseparable bond between education and the formation of national character mean that schools become partisan political centers? The future of Mexican education will be vitally important to the rest of the third world.

¹¹ The figures have been extrapolated from several sources, often with major discrepancies: *Visión*, *Hispanoamericano*, *Excelsior*, *Diario Oficial*, *State of the Nation Message*.

MEXICO VERSUS MALTHUS

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Sierra Madre,"¹³ whose mineral yield underwrote in turn Spanish colonial officials, nineteenth century hidalgos, and Porfirian aristocrats, was no longer the national generator of wealth. Binational Mexican-United States corporations in the 1940's and 1950's spawned a new class of entrepreneurs and low-level, middle-level managers. New job categories opened in the manufacturing and sale of plastics, synthetic fibers, bicycles, cement, steel tubing, typewriters, and automobiles.

From the 1940's into the 1970's, federal government budgets have emphasized the expansion of industry, with one-third or more of the annual expenditures channeled into economic development, especially industrialization. Engineers, technicians, and skilled tradesmen began to modernize the social face of Mexico's work force.

Tens of thousands of sons and daughters of peasant farmers became the first members of their families to receive formal education beyond primary school. Between 1950 and 1970, the ratio of mechanics to automobiles and trucks in use improved by one-third and the ratio of electricians to towns with electricity improved by one-fourth. Hundreds of towns obtained electric power for the first time during that interim.

Ifigenia Martínez de Navarrete, former dean of the National University's School of Economics, in 1960 estimated that the middle class made up 30 percent of the Mexican population, the upper class 5 percent, and the lower class 65 percent.¹⁴ None of the analyses so far of the 1970 census data indicate much variance with this profile.¹⁵ Roughly one-third of the Mexicans may be classified socially and economically as middle class.

In 1947, Sears Roebuck set the pattern in Mexico for modern merchandising methods, soon copied and expanded by the Mexican-owned *Salinas y Rocha* complex of retail stores and factories, turning out goods for the growing middle sectors. In 1952, two graduates of the Wharton School of Finance, Hugo

Salinas and Joel Rocha, Jr., sons of the founders of this chain of stores, brought credit-card culture to their middle-class customers in Mexico City, Monterrey, Guanajuato, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí and Aguascalientes. Today the S y R card is honored in two dozen other cities.

With backing by the privately owned *Banco Nacional de México* chain of banks (not to be confused with the government's central banking system or *Banco de México*), three national networks of department stores—*Palacio de Hierro*, *Puerto de Liverpool*, and *Puerto de Veracruz*—during the past 20 years have reflected the middle-class consumerism which symbolizes the 145 big cities of Mexico (each with populations of more than 25,000 in 1970), and especially the republic's 13 cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants each.

In Mexico, in 1968, humming computers began to signal the newest stage in modern work styles, which had been antedated by job categories linked to the adding machine, the slide rule, and IBM punch cards two decades before. Air freight and domestically built trucks have enlarged the regional Mexican trading markets as technology has begun to diversify the economic source of job categories.

NATIONWIDE TRANSPORTATION

During the *Porfiriato* of 1876–1911, Mexican railroads grew from a single trunk line connecting Mexico City eastward with the port city of Veracruz into an extensive nationwide system of tracks northward and southward. Rails linked the federal capital to Brownsville, Texas, and San Diego, California. To the south, lines extended to Tapachula, Chiapas, on the Guatemalan border.

East and west, lines interlaced the cities and markets south of San Luis Potosí, but the northern rim of the republic remained without east-west rail routes.

Not until 1936 did the government complete paving the Pan American Highway from Laredo to Mexico City. Even today, with Tijuana in the northwest corner and Matamoros in the northeast corner linked to all southern cities by highways, and with the Baja California peninsula itself sporting a new paved highway to its tip, a shortage of east-west roads hinders trucks and buses going from Sonora to Chihuahua to Coahuila to Tamaulipas states.

As of 1974, the biggest hurdle to privately owned vehicular traffic came when the government allowed the retail price of gasoline to rise to two pesos per liter or 64 (U.S.) cents per gallon for the higher octane grade and 46 cents for the lower octane grade, double the prices which had prevailed for a decade.

Airlines have also become basic economic and social life lines for Mexico. In 1911, airline pioneer Thomas Braniff demonstrated the utility of commercial flights from Mexico City to suburban Xochimilco

¹³ United States-born Traven Torsvan, a naturalized Mexican citizen, wrote the novel *Treasure of the Sierra Madre* under the pen name B. Traven. A best-seller in Mexico and the United States, it became a 1947 film starring Humphrey Bogart. When Torsvan died in 1969, literary critic Carlos Fuentes said the novel and film had symbolized the age-old Mexican quest for gold, from the Aztecs and Spanish explorers down to the prospectors of the 1920's.

¹⁴ Ifigenia Martínez de Navarrete, *La distribución del ingreso* (México, D. F.: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, UNAM, 1960).

¹⁵ Martin C. Needler, *Politics and Society in Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 62. See also Centro de Estudios Económicos y Demográficos, editors, *Dinámica de la población de México* (México, D. F.: Colegio de México, 1970), pp. 12–83.

and to Pachuca. In 1912, President Francisco Madero let United States pilot George Dyott take him for a 16-minute flight, the first chief executive in Latin America to fly while in office.¹⁶

In 1921, Mexico's first air transportation firm, *Compañía Mexicana de Transportación* (CMT), was founded in Tampico by administrators of the petroleum companies to carry payrolls safely from Tampico to the Veracruz oilfields, avoiding the robberies plaguing trucks and trains crossing the path of bandits.

In 1924, the *Compañía Mexicana de Aviación* (CMA) began operations, CMA buying out the older CMT airline. Today CMA remains Mexico's one major airline; its majority stock is held by private Mexican investors, and the government holds a minority share of the stock.

Mexico's largest airline, *Aeroméxico*, until 1973 known as *Aeronaves de México*, owned by the federal government, began as a private service in May, 1934, when Antonio Díaz Lombardo began regular flights between Mexico City and Acapulco.¹⁷

Yet despite relatively good land and air transportation within most of the national territory, discernible village life patterns persist. Millions of peasants remain without automobiles, bicycles, horses, or even the price of a first-class bus ticket to a distant city.

Unemployed braceros walk up to 2,000 miles from southern and central towns to cross the United States border to harvest crops for hourly wages meager by our standards but lucrative to those who may have earned less than \$100 during the past year.

If we do not use the government's arbitrary classification that 2,500 or more inhabitants constitute an urban settlement, we can include some towns of 10,000 among village-culture settlements, in terms of life style. That is, many Mexican towns of 10,000 to 20,000 population lack sewage control, telephones except in governmental offices,¹⁸ refrigerators in most homes, and similar indices of modern living. Big city slums also lack such facilities but are adjacent to metropolitan neighborhoods containing them and therefore are not isolated from their direct or indirect impact, as are many Mexican small towns and villages away from paved roads.

¹⁶ Marvin Alisky, "Airlines: Makers of Modern Mexico," *Mexican-American Review*, October, 1966, pp. 20-21.

¹⁷ *Aeronaves al servicio de la patria* (México, D. F.: Editorial A de M, 1966), p. 1.

¹⁸ In 1972, Mexico achieved her long-awaited goal of having 2 million telephones in service, more than were in use in Brazil with twice Mexico's population. However, a maldistribution of telephones persists; a majority of them are found in Mexico City and the five largest provincial cities.

¹⁹ *Medios Mexicanos* (México, D. F.: Standard Rate and Data Service, 1973), pp. 97-98.

²⁰ Marvin Alisky, "Radio's Role in Mexico," *Journalism Quarterly*, Winter, 1954, pp. 68-72.

VILLAGE AND CITY ATTIRE

Rural Mexicans typically wear white cotton pajama-like trousers and shirts with loose-woven straw hats. Their urban counterparts don blue work shirts and variations of Levis.

Women can wear cotton dresses, whose hemlines sometimes rise above the knee to miniskirt length, or slacks, ranging from jeans to denims. The old notion that Mexican women do not wear long trousers in public lives mostly in the minds of North Americans whose last trip southward came five or ten years ago.

One accoutrement, the transistor radio, can be found in the pockets of laborers, in the hands of students, dangling from the belts of clerks, and protruding from the knit-purse *bolsas* of women. This medallion of the masses has begun to link the Mexican nation musically and journalistically after centuries of pre-broadcast relative isolation.

MALDISTRIBUTION OF MEDIA

Mexico's chief mass medium of communication is radio. Wide distribution of inexpensive transistor radios in the late 1960's and early 1970's contrasted sharply with the slower growth of television sales because of the vast difference in price between the two appliances. Newspaper circulations have remained static in the face of population growth, whereas magazine circulations have sagged slightly.

In 1953, Mexico had only 1.53 million radios for a population of 26 million, a ratio of 17.33 persons per receiver. By 1973, homes and offices had 14 million radios (standard-band, 550 to 1600 kilocycles), plus bonus numbers of shortwave and frequency-modulation sets, for a population of almost 56 million. That gives a ratio of four persons for each set in daily use or, counting shortwave and FM listening, a ratio of 3.6 persons per set.¹⁹

Thanks to transistors, which do not require electric power circuits connected to village or slum homes, the sets in daily use have zoomed upward, now accounting for most of the radios in use, whereas two decades ago some of the radios listed annually remained silent when big batteries burned out or household current was cut off for non-payment of bills.²⁰

In 1973, the republic had 2.5 million television sets in daily use. Determining the ratio of citizens per set remains difficult because of the Mexican custom of group televiewing.

Newspaper readership has been inhibited partly by the fact that more than one-third of the adult population simply cannot read with enough comprehension to understand or enjoy dailies or weeklies.

With per capita income at \$585 in 1971, and with the annual inflation rate then at 6 percent, magazine sales began to go down slowly, and newspaper circulations began to level off. In 1973, 40 percent of

all Mexican families had an income of \$80 or less a month, and the annual rise in the cost of living had soared to 18 percent. Food costs alone eliminate spending for periodicals.

Even though daily newspapers retained their price of 1.60 pesos or 13 (U.S.) cents for weekday editions and 16 cents for Sunday editions, during 1973, the three largest metropolitan centers of the republic had 59 percent of the daily newspaper sales. The remainder of the nation, with 80 percent of the population, buys only 41 percent of the newspapers.²¹

Inasmuch as newspaper readership remains mostly urban, rural Mexicans typically do not have the detailed printed information which might enable them to become politically aware or civically active.

The large dailies of Mexico City—*Excelsior*, *La Prensa*, *Novedades*, *El Universal*, *El Sol*, *El Día*, *El Heraldo*—circulate among the economic and political elite throughout the republic. Although *Día* and *Prensa* reflect leftist views, basically they support the dominant party (PRI) and the federal government almost as consistently as do the other papers, which are pro-establishment. The PRI itself circulates a daily, *El Nacional*.

Dissident political opinions do surface in individual by-lined columns and editorials, and the conservative opposition PAN receives editorial support periodically from columnists for *El Sol* in Mexico City and its 36 provincial affiliated dailies of the Garcia Valseca chain in 20 states.

The Marxist-oriented weekly news periodical, *Siempre*, principal voice of the Popular Socialist party, remains the second most influential magazine in the republic, after pro-government *Tiempo*.

SILVER SCREENS IN HAMLETS

In 1956, the republic had 2,062 movie theaters, most of them owned by two private corporations. Between 1959 and 1963, the federal government bought up the stock in these theater chains owned by United States millionaire William Jenkins, long-time resident of Puebla,²² and by former Mexican President Abelardo L. Rodríguez. The government thereby gained control of motion picture distribution for 90 percent of the regular audiences.

By 1974, Mexico had 3,971 movie theaters. Unlike in the United States or Europe, where television has eroded the all-time high attendance figures of 1948–1950, in Mexico most working-class adults continue to see a movie every week or two. In 1972, annual paid attendance reached 73 million in paid admissions, up from 62 million in 1957. Going to the

movies remains a Mexican social habit dwarfed only by attendance at soccer games.

In the 1950's, 60 percent of all motion pictures exhibited in Mexico were produced in the United States, approximately 30 percent in Mexico's own studios and the remaining 10 percent in Europe.

In the 1970's, Mexican feature-length film production has shriveled. From the one-year high mark of 104 Mexican films produced during 1957, production decreased annually to a 1973 total of only a dozen films.²³ Mexican producers and directors are busy turning out television programs and commercials. With the federal government now guiding what private producers can and cannot film through the Bureau of Cinematography of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Secretaría de Gobernación*), movie production remains private largely in an artistic sense. That is, actors, writers, directors, and producers are not employees of the government.

But they might as well be civil servants for, in addition to the government controls stemming from the Cinema Bureau, and the public corporation ownership of the former Jenkins and Rodríguez theaters, there is the matter of financing.

Unlike Hollywood, where private corporations underwrite film production, in Mexico most films are financed by the government's Cinema Bank. A producer may bring minority-stock financing with him, but the National Cinema Bank loans more than 51 percent of the production funds. Current president of the Cinema Bank, Rodolfo Echeverría, is a brother of the President of Mexico, and his son, Rodolfo, Jr., is executive officer (official mayor) of the PRI.

Hollywood's share of the movies regularly exhibited has dwindled to half its percentages of a decade ago. Taking up the slack and the shortage of Mexican-made films are Italian, British, French, Argentine, German, Brazilian, and a few Russian, Czech, and Hong Kong films, each with Spanish sub-titles.

Mexican producers around 1965 discovered rock musicians, and around 1969 they noticed the generation gap. Today's stars include girls in bluejeans or pantsuits, like Angélica María, projecting a hint of Women's Lib in roles as a career woman, and boys with long hair and pastel knit pants, like Julio Alemán, articulating the skepticism youth feels toward middle-age standards. As long as the social commentary does not step on the toes of the PRI, the federal government, or the politico-economic power elite, scripts can procure government financing.

The biggest box office success in years, "*Mecánica Nacional*," opened in Mexico City's Real Cine in December, 1972, and exhibited there to full houses nightly until October, 1973. The 42-week run made this film approach the all-time box office successes of comedian "Cantinflas" (actor Mario Moreno), or

²¹ *Medios Mexicanos*, 1973, pp. 8–9.

²² In his will, the late Mr. Jenkins left a fortune in land acquired from theater profits to the University of the Americas.

²³ *Excelsior*, January 7, 1974.

such foreign hits as "Gone with the Wind" and "Sound of Music." As of February, 1974, "*Mecánica*" was still drawing crowds as a second-run feature at Mexico City's Insurgentes 70 moviehouse, plus crowds in theaters in dozens of provincial cities.

"*Mecánica Nacional*" illustrates the newer latitude Mexican writers have in making social commentary. The plot revolves around a middle-aged, middle-class auto mechanic, played by Manolo Fágúegas, Mexico's versatile star actor-producer-director of stage, television, and films.

He convinced the Cinema Bank and the Cinema Bureau that the time has come to laugh at Mexican social customs. The Mexican Motion Picture Academy agreed by awarding "*Mecánica*" its "Oscar" or *Ariel de Oro* as the best Mexican picture of 1973. Spanish-speaking fans in Los Angeles, New York, and in several South American cities have also flocked to see Mexican machismo and pistol-waving satirized by witty writing and acting.

Generally, the innocence of Hollywood of the late 1930's still sets Mexican film standards on physical embraces and marital scenes. Deviant behavior is neither glamorized nor emphasized.

For six decades, Mexican political leaders publicly have proclaimed their laical article of faith to be the revolution, and material progress for the middle class seems self-evident. But given the population explosion and, recently, a rate of inflation which nullifies annual Gross National Product growth as far as the working-class majority is concerned, frustration surges beneath the political surface of Mexico. This frustration has erupted during the past six years in dramatic episodes.

The student riots in Mexico City in 1968 (which threatened to cancel the Olympics Mexico was hosting), and more than three dozen kidnappings of industrialists, governmental administrators, diplomats, and other newsworthy hostages by guerrillas from 1970 to the present, hint at a degree of alienation not reflected in the overwhelmingly pro-government press. Occasional dramatic or musical or other fine arts expression, as in the film "*Mecánica Nacional*," questions majority norms.

In 1973 and so far in 1974, troops have quelled rioting students at the University of Yucatán in Mérida, the University of Sinaloa in Culiacán, and the University of Puebla in Puebla, plus various confrontations at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* or UNAM). For two years, UNAM classes and other formal activities have been alternately suspended or minimized by student protests, work stoppages by non-teaching staffers, and brief student-faculty walkouts in sympathy with student strikes as they occur in provincial universities and preparatory schools.

A dispute between rival labor federations for the

local affiliation of non-teaching UNAM staffers paralyzed the campus, prompting university president Pablo González Casanova to resign late in 1972. In January, 1973, new UNAM president G. Soberón became the first National University rector in modern history to take his oath of office in an outdoor courtyard because protesting students blocked public entrance to campus auditoriums.

Student agitation may be the most visible or articulate cutting edge for a larger subsurface group of marginal citizens, alienated because they are relatively untouched by a half-century of revolutionary reforms obviously benefiting the middle-class urbanites.

But whatever sporadic outbursts the government permits before unleashing police and troops, the tendency of Mexican society remains a posture of conformity. An overwhelming majority of Mexicans are not about to fight a new civil war nor to overturn the middle-aged revolution.

Their reading habits remain too meager for widespread political activism. Their listening and television habits remain enmeshed in soap opera tears, slapstick comedy, and pop and quasi-folk music. Their movie viewing essentially remains escapism, with some developing social criticism creeping in.

As a nation of families, Mexicans remain fertile, up to their collective ears in babies, squeezed by inflation, but still buoyed emotionally by a paradoxical mixture of pride in the revolution and disgust with its shortcomings.

The Mexican social fabric cannot be woven in any simple pattern of black and white threads. Woven together are a rainbow of colors and a full spectrum of human traits, an embroidered mosaic, multifaceted but uniquely and unmistakably Mexican.

MEXICO IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

(Continued from page 225)

As to short-run macroeconomic policy, Mexico learned that the brakes worked too well in 1971, and the accelerator worked too well in 1973. While the Mexican economy cannot be "fine tuned" any more than any other economy can, there must be some half-way house which can be reached on the basis of the past three years of experience.

There remain considerable political tensions, but there seems to be no real organized opposition. If President Echeverría felt beleaguered in 1973, he at least reached the kind of practical compromises which have kept Mexican regimes stable for 40 years. And he can take some comfort from the fact that democratic governments everywhere are in trouble these days.

By world standards, economic or political, Mexico looks rather good.

MEXICO'S GROWING PAINS

(Continued from page 194)

that, as their political consciousness develops, the countries of South America (most of those in Central America and the Caribbean remain too weak) may develop foreign policies which, while acknowledging the unavoidable presence of the United States in the hemisphere, may, like the Mexicans, avoid helpless dependence on the United States. Then they will be able to achieve national autonomy and self-respect without falling into the mirror image of dependence, an impractical and ultimately self-defeating Yankee-phobia.

In this respect, too, Mexico has pioneered the frontiers of "development" and in doing so has created a synthesis whose significance transcends her own borders.

THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

(Continued from page 199)

González Casanova as rector in 1972. Inflation has stunned Mexico's economy, as it has elsewhere, with demands by labor leaders for a 33-percent pay raise and a 40-hour week as yet unresolved. Oil prices, kept artificially low for years as part of the government's efforts to buoy up its petroleum monopoly, PEMEX, have risen sharply as have electricity rates.²⁶ Economists point out that developing nations like Mexico may be the hardest hit in the coming years, caught as it were in the crossfire between the industrialized powers and the producers of necessary raw materials.

Where does this leave the Mexican revolution itself? To the pessimistic, the revolution has died and awaits burial at the hands of the magnates and bureaucrats (and the growing colony of foreign businessmen and multinational corporate executives invited to Mexico in recent years). To others, the work of the revolution remains unfinished; its mandate must be transferred to future generations.²⁷ To the most cynical, the only uniquely revolutionary aspect of the revolution is the mystique by which it has been packaged and sold to the Mexican people. Yet myth or fact, the revolution persists, a witness to its strength, and a testimony to the flexibility of the revolutionary ideology. In that flexibility lies the key to the past and the promise for the future.

²⁶ *Latin America*, March 23, 1973, vol. 7, no. 12, p. 95; August 17, 1973, vol. 7, no. 33, p. 257; December 14, 1973, vol. 7, no. 50, p. 399.

²⁷ Gilberto Loyo, "The Revolution Has Not Finished Its Task," in Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

MEXICO'S INDIANS

(Continued from page 207)

every Mayo birth marks the return of one of the ancestors to the land of the living. One must be born a Mayo and speak the language to be a member of the community. Mayos do not object to speaking Spanish; indeed, they often see it as a necessity, but they make sure their children speak Mayo. In recent years, under the influence of a Mayo prophet, Mayo ceremonialism has been revitalized and new ceremonies have developed, enlarging community obligations and participation.

The significance of this example is that the Mayos have looked at the mestizo way of life and have learned to associate with mestizos. They have not liked what they have seen and have more or less consciously decided that they want to continue to be Mayos. This means, among other things, that they prefer to put their resources of time and money into community-reinforcing ceremonials rather than in striving for the symbols of upward mobility valued by the mestizos. As a result, they retain their own beliefs, values, and behavior patterns.⁷

The Mayo example is interesting primarily because of the absence of a well-defined residential limit or any political power. Throughout most of Mexico Indian village communities are essentially homogeneous in population, occupying geographic areas with recognized boundaries, and with Indians holding local government positions. Community service includes not only service in the ceremonial system but contributions of labor and funds to public works and responsibility for public offices. In most of these communities the system of ceremonies and ceremonial offices is, nevertheless, perhaps the most important expression of community unity. In many villages individuals are beginning to refuse these obligations, preferring instead the mestizo system of status symbols. This is a measure of mestizoization of the village if continued residence is tolerated; but often such individuals are pressured to move to mestizo communities. But as Frank Cancian has shown of Zinacantan, Chiapas,⁸ increased prosperity may lead to strengthening and elaborating the ceremonial system. As with the Mayo, the majority of Indian communities have

⁷ To give concrete examples of Indian-mestizo differences at the risk of overgeneralization: While both are family-oriented the mestizo tends to emphasize the extended family, the Indian to emphasize the community and to recognize extensive obligations to it. The mestizo complex of hyper-masculinity known as *machismo* and its corollary, *marianismo*, the Mexican version of "momism," are weakly developed or absent among Indians. Both prize land but the Indian tends to enjoy working it with his own hands, the mestizo considers such labor a mark of inferiority.

⁸ Frank Cancian, *Economics and Prestige in a Mayo Community* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965).

opted for a pluralistic position in Mexican society.

Unfortunately, few mestizos have bothered to ask what Indians want or considered the answer important. And of course various Indian groups want different things. Quite a few would agree with the old man in a remote Mixtec Indian village in Oaxaca who, when asked what he wanted, responded: "Why don't they just let us alone?" But most are interested in being better able to feed, house, and clothe their families, they can be interested in improved health methods, and in some education, although much of what they have available seems irrelevant to them. On the other hand, they resent and resist efforts to change "*los costumbres*," the customs. In short, they may want to produce, live in peace with their neighbors, and even take an interest in being Mexicans, but they want to be Indian Mexicans, not mestizos. The INI program recognizes this where assimilationists find it an affront.

The migration of Indians to the city has already been mentioned, and is often pointed to as showing the success of assimilationist policies. Unfortunately the urban Indian has been little studied, and most information comes either from earlier studies on migrants from Tepoztlan by Robert Redfield and Oscar Lewis, or in scattered field notes and passages in studies of rural villages. Nevertheless, it seems clear that most Indian migrants go to the city for economic reasons. They lack land or sufficient land in their village, cannot find employment locally, or are attracted by higher wages in the city. Some young people may be motivated by curiosity or a spirit of adventure. Except for a few with advanced education, most become manual laborers or unskilled factory workers or, if women, household servants. From Oaxaca, at least, the most Indian state, more women have migrated to the city than men.

Evidence suggests that most of these urban migrants do not consider themselves permanently separated from their home community. Many expect to make a stake to enable them to return home, buy a piece of land, or start a store. Often this ambition is not immediately realized. In any case most of them keep in touch with their home village and often with their fellow villagers living in the city. Certainly many Oaxaca girls go to Mexico City to take domestic jobs already arranged for by friends or relatives.

Villagers sometimes form lobbies if their home village wants federal help for an improvement—new school, water system, a road—waiting on the appropriate agency until by sheer persistence they usually get what they want. Migrants from some villages form clubs with an elected *mesa directiva* or board of directors. In the case of one Mixtec village in Oaxaca the board duplicates the hierarchy of civil offices at home. By contributions and frequent visits home, the migrants pick the village officials, decide

priorities on public works, and contribute to them and the performance of the traditional ceremonials. On a less formal basis, migrants, including some in the United States, contribute to the support of both ceremonials and public works. Some villages in Oaxaca send regular fund-raising letters to residents outside the village.

Migrants may also make contributions to relatives, especially aged parents, for the support of children left behind, or aid to brothers and sisters. A great many return home on visits, especially for the fiesta of the patron saint of the village or for the universally observed Day of the Dead and All Saints' Day ceremonies. After the latter, in Oaxaca in 1967 for three days and nights Indians returning to Mexico City formed a column four abreast for a block and sometimes more outside the bus terminal. These visits not only maintain family and community ties, but many young people seek and find spouses on such occasions.

The available evidence, then, indicates that migrants still consider themselves members of the village community and are accepted at home. Only after years of no contact with a migrant would he be forgotten as a community member. By emigrating, he relieves some of the growing pressures of population on resources and by sending money home he aides village residents and helps maintain the ceremonial and civil community structure. Individual migrants may be assimilated but the process is long. In the meantime the Indian community is strengthened.

The current status of the Indian problem still revolves about the relative virtues of assimilationist and pluralist policies. The implications of neither position have been fully faced in Mexico. The assimilationist policies mean either forcing the Indian against his will to become a rural mestizo or an urban migrant. But the urban migrant, by contributing economically and by relieving land pressures, strengthens the Indian community and its will to resist mestizoization. For the assimilationist policy to succeed, the Indian community must be destroyed. History indicates that Mexican Indians are generally non-violent, but will resort to violence against external threats to the local community. The pluralist approach in part avoids this conflict, allowing the Indian community to maintain its integrity and unique qualities. But it does not face the ultimate problems of communities where increased population overtakes available resources. In the short term, Mexico must decide what kind of an Indian problem she wishes, for it is very unlikely that the problem will go away with either assimilationist or pluralist policies. The longer run may see the disintegration and collapse of the Indian community under population pressures and resource exhaustion, problems unfortunately shared with all Mexicans.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of March, 1974, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See also *U.K., Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 4—The 9 Common Market members, at a meeting in Belgium, announce a joint offer of long-term economic, technical, and cultural cooperation with the Arab world. U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger arrives in Brussels to brief the foreign ministers on American efforts to secure a Middle East peace.

Mar. 6—Responding to the U.S. State Department's charge, made yesterday, French diplomatic sources deny that the U.S. was not consulted before the Common Market offered to cooperate with 20 Arab countries.

Mar. 19—British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan asserts that Britain will not try to destroy the EEC in renegotiating the terms of British membership in the Common Market.

Mar. 25—The Parliamentary Association for European-Arabic Cooperation is formed. Christopher Mayhew, Labour member of the British Parliament, and Raymond Offroy, a French Gaullist member of Parliament, head the new association, made up of the members of Parliaments in the Common Market countries.

Middle East

(See also *Intl, Oil Embargo, OPEC; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 1—After his arrival from Israel, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger confers with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on troop disengagement.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko arrives in Egypt a few hours after Kissinger has departed for Israel.

Red Cross inspectors pay their first visit to Israeli prisoners of war held by Syria.

Mar. 2—U.S. officials report that Israel and Syria have agreed to send delegations to the U.S. later this month to talk independently with Kissinger on the separation of Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights area.

Kissinger flies from Syria to Saudi Arabia, and later to Jordan.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat confers with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Mar. 3—King Hussein of Jordan meets with Kissinger in Amman.

Mar. 4—The separation of forces along the Suez Canal is completed. Israeli forces pull back to new lines in the Sinai Desert; Egyptian forces control both sides of the Suez Canal for the first time since the 1967 war.

Mar. 5—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko flies to Syria after a 5-day visit to Egypt. In a joint Soviet-Egyptian communiqué, the 2 governments assert that the Soviet Union must be closely involved in a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Mar. 7—In a joint communiqué, Gromyko and Syrian President Assad warn of the possibility of renewed hostilities if Israel does not withdraw from all Arab territory occupied since 1967.

Mar. 11—Jordan's King Hussein arrives in the U.S. for talks with U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and others.

President Nixon and King Hussein confer on the Middle East situation.

Mar. 13—Israeli and Syrian forces clash along the Golan Heights front.

Mar. 25—A 4-day meeting of the 21-nation Arab League opens in Tunis to discuss the Middle East and its relations with Europe and the Third World.

Tunisia and Jordan announce the restoration of diplomatic relations.

Mar. 27—A split is apparent in the Arab ministers conference. Syria and Egypt disagree over military disengagement with Israel. The Syrians are also critical of the 7-Arab-nation decision to lift the oil embargo.

Oil Embargo

(See also *Intl, OPEC; Saudi Arabia*)

Mar. 10—In Cairo, the oil ministers from 6 of the 9 Arab countries that originally imposed the oil embargo against the U.S. arrive to attend a meeting called by Egypt to consider ending the embargo. Since 3 nations refuse to attend (Algeria, Libya, and Syria), an Egyptian official announces that the conference will be postponed until March 13 and will meet in Tripoli.

Mar. 11—President Sadat of Egypt confers with the oil ministers of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi on proposals to end the embargo on oil exports to the U.S.

Mar. 13—"Informed sources" report that at a meeting in Libya, 9 Arab oil-producing countries agree to end the embargo on oil exports to the U.S.

Mar. 14—"Informed Arab sources" report that at yesterday's meeting, 9 Arab oil-producing countries decided to review in 2 months the suspension of the embargo against the U.S.; the Arabs want to make certain that the U.S. will use its influence to persuade Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

(See also *Intl. Oil Embargo*)

Mar. 16—Meeting in Vienna, the OPEC members—12 Arab and non-Arab states—debate whether to increase or reduce crude oil prices. A price cut is reportedly ruled out.

Mar. 18—In a formal announcement at their Vienna meeting, 7 Arab oil-producing states declare that they will lift the embargo (imposed in October, 1973) on oil exports to the U.S. Libya and Syria refuse to accept the decision of the majority of the Arab oil-producing states. Algeria suspends the embargo conditionally until June 1. The Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum Affairs promises that Saudi Arabia will increase production at once by a million barrels a day; all of the increase is to go to the U.S. The embargo against Denmark and the Netherlands will be continued. West Germany and Italy are placed on a list of friendly countries; they are now eligible for supplies to meet their needs completely.

War in Indochina

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 7—In Cambodia, 742 former rebels swear loyalty to President Lon Nol's government. This is the largest defection of anti-government forces since the Cambodian war began in April, 1970.

Mar. 8—The prisoner exchange between South Vietnam and the Vietcong is completed. All prisoners who were officially listed as captured before the January, 1973, cease-fire have been released.

Mar. 15—A U.S. transport drops ammunition for government troops in the Cambodian seaport of Kampot as the troops begin a counteroffensive against rebel positions.

Mar. 18—In South Vietnam, a 48-hour battle in the Central Highlands between government troops and North Vietnamese forces ends. Some 440 North Vietnamese and 75 South Vietnamese soldiers have been killed.

ARGENTINA

Mar. 2—In Córdoba, shootings and bombings occur for the 3d consecutive night in the conflict between right-wing and left-wing Peronists.

Mar. 8—A right-wing Peronist is killed, the 19th victim, apparently, of political assassination in the last 7 months.

The Chamber of Deputies approves a measure passed earlier by the Senate empowering President Juan D. Perón to replace the deposed governor of Córdoba with a federal official.

Mar. 12—President Perón names Diulio Danilo Brunello, an official of the Ministry of Social Welfare, to replace the ousted left-wing Peronist governor of Córdoba.

Mar. 13—Exxon's Argentine subsidiary says it has paid \$14.2 million in ransom to left-wing guerrillas to secure the release of the American manager of its Argentine refinery, kidnapped over 3 months ago.

Mar. 14—There is no word whether Victor E. Samuelson, kidnapped manager of the Exxon Corporation's Argentine subsidiary, has been set free.

AUSTRALIA

Mar. 25—In an appeal to Moscow and Washington, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam asks for the "exercise of mutual restraint" in the Indian Ocean. The government fears a large-scale build-up of U.S. and Soviet forces if the planned expansion of a U.S. naval facility at Diego Garcia island is approved. The U.S. received permission for expansion in the British-ruled island before the recent British elections. The Labour party has the agreement under review.

BELGIUM

Mar. 10—Elections for a new Parliament are held; over 6 million persons cast their ballots.

Mar. 11—Election returns show that the Social Christian party won 32.3 percent of the vote and 72 parliamentary seats in the election yesterday; the Socialist party won 26.7 percent of the vote and 58 seats; the Liberal party won 15.2 percent of the vote and 30 seats.

Mar. 21—Leo Tindemans, leader of the Social Christian party, is asked by King Baudouin to form a new national Cabinet.

BRAZIL

Mar. 15—General Ernesto Geisel is sworn in as President.

BURMA

Mar. 2—Prime Minister Ne Win announces that his revolutionary council will return political power to the People's Assembly; 12 years ago, on March 2, 1962, Ne Win seized power.

Mar. 26—Fighting during the last week between government forces and rebels in the southeast is responsible for the deaths of 90 persons and the

wounding of more than 160. There have been 15 clashes between the Communists and the government army since February.

CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

CANADA

Mar. 14—The government of Quebec declares that French will replace English as the official language of the province.

Mar. 27—The provincial premiers and Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau reach agreement on a compromise price for oil, when the price freeze expires April 1. Western oil producers want to charge world market prices; eastern consumers want the government to maintain controls on the price of oil.

CHILE

(See *U.K., Great Britain*)

CHINA

Mar. 23—In a formal diplomatic protest, China accuses the Soviets of using an armed helicopter on spying missions in Sinkiang Province. The helicopter in question was captured after it landed on the Soviet-Chinese border, 300 miles north of the capital of Sinkiang, in an area where there are important oil fields and nuclear testing grounds.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East, Oil Embargo, OPEC*)

Mar. 30—President Anwar Sadat ends his visit to Yugoslavia to confer with Yugoslav President Tito; at a press conference he denies that there are conflicts among the nations of the Arab world or among other nonaligned nations over policy toward the superpowers.

ETHIOPIA

Mar. 5—In the face of mounting unrest, Emperor Haile Selassie announces that he has agreed to call a constitutional convention to initiate constitutional reforms and to create a new system of democratic government; the Premier will be made responsible to Parliament.

Mar. 7—A general strike begins; workers demand economic and social change.

Mar. 10—Ethiopia's general strike ends; the labor unions announce that some 100,000 workers will return to their jobs tomorrow, after government concessions on 16 demands.

Mar. 12—*The New York Times* reports that the military mutiny that began 2 weeks ago is continuing in the Ethiopian Air Force; enlisted men in the Air Force are demanding the ouster of 21 officers.

Mar. 21—Premier Endalkachew Makonnen announces Selassie's decision to convene a conference of 30 experts to revise the 1955 constitution.

Mar. 28—The military rebel occupation of Asmara ends after 3 days. Rebels have demanded trials for the top civilian and military personnel arrested in the February mutiny, as well as overall civil court reforms.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, EEC; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 1—It is announced that a new, smaller French Cabinet, led by Premier Pierre Messmer, has been named. Messmer, who resigned last month, was named again by President Georges Pompidou to form a new government.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 7—In Berlin, East and West German negotiators reach an agreement on setting up permanent diplomatic missions in each other's capitals. Over a year ago, the 2 countries agreed to establish diplomatic ties.

GUATEMALA

Mar. 6—The government-controlled electoral registry announces that General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud Garcia won the election of March 3d with 41.2 percent of the vote; General Efraim Rios Montt of the National Opposition Front won 35.7 percent of the vote.

Mar. 7—It is reported that the National Opposition Front, which claims that Rios Montt won the election with 44.8 percent of the vote, has pledged a nonviolent resistance campaign if its candidate is not proclaimed victorious.

Mar. 12—Congress proclaims General Laugerud Garcia the winner of the presidential election. Rios Montt challenges this act of Congress.

HONG KONG

Mar. 23—Chinese is made an official language in addition to English.

INDIA

Mar. 24—Students in the state of Bihar threaten to continue their agitation until the state government falls, the legislature is dissolved, and new elections are called. Police have partially succeeded in blocking demonstrations against high prices and what the students regard as political corruption.

Mar. 28—The Cabinet announces that the government is abandoning its year-old program to distribute wheat and eliminate the jobs of private traders. Shortages have developed; the price of wheat has risen 36 percent; hoarding and black

marketing have prevented the government from keeping the price of wheat stable.

IRAN

Mar. 5—Iranian and Iraqi border forces fire on each other for the 2d day.

Mar. 6—*Pars*, the Iranian government press agency, reports that Iranian and Iraqi forces have fought with tanks, mortar, and artillery.

IRAQ

(See also *Iran*)

Mar. 11—The Iraqi government, just before the expiration of a deadline set 4 years ago, grants limited local self-rule to the Kurds in the northern region. The Iraqi offer—proclaimed in a speech to the nation by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr—falls short of the Kurdish demands.

Vice President Saddam Hussein says that the Kurdish Democratic party has been told that the Kurds have 2 weeks to approve the offer of self-rule and join the country's National Front. The Kurdish party has refused to join the Front.

Mar. 14—Kurdish sources disclose that fighting has erupted between Iraqi forces and Kurdish tribesmen.

Mar. 16—Fighting diminishes between government forces and rebel Kurds. The Kurds appear to be in control of large sections of northern Iraq bordering Turkey.

Mar. 23—Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko arrives for a 5-day visit as the expiration date of the ultimatum to General al-Barzani (head of the Kurdish Democratic party) nears.

IRELAND

(See also *U.K., Northern Ireland*)

Mar. 12—Senator William Fox, a Protestant, is found shot to death at a farmhouse near the Northern Ireland border, where Protestant and Catholic terrorists have been active.

Mar. 13—Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave, in a "solemn declaration," states that Northern Ireland "... is within the United Kingdom, and my Government accepts this as a fact."

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 3—Premier Golda Meir announces that she will abandon her 5-week attempt to form a minority coalition government.

Mar. 4—At the urging of her Labor party, Premier Meir agrees to try to form a coalition Cabinet in the next 24 hours.

Mar. 5—Premier Meir announces that she will complete the formation of the Cabinet. Moshe Dayan

will serve as defense minister and Shimon Peres as minister of communications. Previously, Dayan refused to serve in the Cabinet unless Meir expanded her coalition government to include the right-wing Likud party.

Mar. 10—Premier Meir and her coalition Cabinet receive a vote of confidence, 62-46 (with 9 abstentions), in Parliament. The new Cabinet is sworn in. The coalition is composed of Meir's Labor party, an affiliated list of Arab representatives, the Independent Liberal party, and the National Religious party.

ITALY

Mar. 2—Premier Mariano Rumor's government resigns following the break-up of the center-left coalition on which it was based.

Mar. 6—President Giovanni Leone asks Rumor to form a new government.

Mar. 14—Rumor submits his new Cabinet to Leone.

Mar. 21—The Treasury Ministry announces the end of the two-tier exchange market. The two-tier market, established on January 22, 1973, is being ended as a result of the abolition of the French two-tier market.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

KOREA, NORTH

Mar. 30—News reaches Tokyo through the official North Korean Central News Agency that a meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea has decided that starting April 1 citizens will pay no taxes of any kind; taxes have been progressively eliminated since 1945.

Mar. 31—The Soviet press agency, *Tass*, endorses the March 18 North Korean demand that the U.S. stop shipping arms and other war materiel into South Vietnam.

MEXICO

Mar. 27—The disappearance and presumed kidnapping of U.S. vice consul John Patterson, stationed in northwest Mexico, is announced by U.S. and Mexican officials. The kidnapping is reported to have occurred March 22.

PORTUGAL

Mar. 14—*The New York Times* reports that 2 leading generals (General Francisco de Costa Gomes, chief of the defense staff, and his deputy, General António de Spínola) have been dismissed because of their demand that Portugal stop fighting guerrillas and start offering political concessions in her African territories.

RUMANIA

Mar. 26—Manea Manescu replaces Ion Gheorghe Maurer as Premier. Maurer is retiring on grounds of age and health after serving for 13 years.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See also *Intl, OPEC*)

Mar. 27—Official sources in Riyadh reveal that the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) has been authorized to produce 8.5 million barrels of oil a day in April, an increase of 1 million barrels a day.

SENEGAL

Mar. 27—Mamadou Dia, former Premier, and two members of his Cabinet, are released from prison. President Leopold S. Senghor released the political prisoners unconditionally. Dia was sentenced to a life term in 1963 after his alleged involvement in a coup d'état.

SWEDEN

Mar. 21—Robert Strausz-Hupé is named by U.S. President Richard Nixon as the new U.S. ambassador to Sweden. This post has been vacant for 15 months.

In a complementary action, Swedish Premier Olof Palme names Count Wilhelm Wachtmeister as the new Swedish ambassador to Washington.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, Middle East, OPEC*)

THAILAND

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

TURKEY

Mar. 25—After a 2-year hiatus, opium poppy cultivation resumes on 6 state farms.

UGANDA

Mar. 26—General Idi Amin is reportedly beginning the systematic killing of army officers suspected of taking part in an unsuccessful coup over the weekend.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Middle East; West Germany; China; U.S., Foreign Policy; North Korea*)

Mar. 1—*Tass* (the Soviet press agency) reports that the Soviet Union has ended its current series of missile tests in the Pacific that began on February 19.

Mar. 5—West German sources disclose that following a meeting in Moscow between Soviet and West German officials, Germany and the Soviet Union have agreed to set up joint companies using joint

capital to operate in countries outside Germany and the U.S.S.R.

Mar. 10—Soviet Communist party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev accuses the West of blocking progress at the Geneva conference on European security.

Mar. 12—President Georges Pompidou of France arrives at the Black Sea resort of Pitsunda for a 2-day meeting with Brezhnev.

Mar. 13—Pompidou ends 2 days of talks with Brezhnev. At a meeting with reporters, Pompidou declares that the major topic of discussion was the European security conference in Geneva.

Mar. 15—In a nationally televised speech, Brezhnev announces that the Communist party's Central Committee has approved a vast agricultural development project for the northern regions, the "non-black-soil zone" of the Russian Republic.

Mar. 22—The U.S.S.R. concludes a \$1-billion trade agreement with a West German steel consortium for an iron and steel plant. Under the terms of the agreement, the Soviets will pay in cash for all West German supplies. The plant is to be built 280 miles southwest of Moscow.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl, EEC; Australia*)

Mar. 4—Prime Minister Edward Heath resigns after his attempts to form a coalition government are rebuffed by the Liberal party. (In last week's election, the Conservative party won 296 seats [a loss of 26]; the Labour party won 301 [a gain of 14]; the Liberal party won 14 seats [an increase of 3]. Neither major party won a clear-cut majority.) Queen Elizabeth asks Harold Wilson, leader of the Labour party, to form a new government.

Mar. 5—Wilson names his Cabinet.

Mar. 6—An agreement between the British government and the striking National Union of Mineworkers is reached. The agreement provides for a 35-percent pay increase.

Mar. 7—The government orders an end to the 3-day work week, effective at midnight tomorrow.

Mar. 11—The state of emergency, put into effect 4 months ago because of the energy shortage, is formally ended at the request of the new Labour government.

Mar. 12—Presenting the Labour party program to Parliament, the Cabinet discloses that Prime Minister Wilson's government will renegotiate the terms of British membership in the Common Market.

Mar. 20—Ian Ball attempts to kidnap Princess Anne and her husband, Captain Mark Phillips. He is seized after he fires several shots into the limousine carrying the royal couple. Four persons, including the Princess's bodyguard, are wounded.

Mar. 24—Restrictions on power and fuel consump-

tion are ended. All fuels except gasoline for cars and planes are available without limit.

Mar. 26—The British Cabinet announces tax increases, food subsidies, and other fiscal measures in an attempt to alleviate current economic difficulties. The budget calls for an increase in the personal income tax rate of a minimum of 3 percent and an increase in the corporate tax of 2 percent. It also grants \$1.2 billion in food subsidies in an attempt to keep prices and wage demands down. Taxes are imposed on nonessential items such as cigarettes, ice cream, and alcoholic beverages. Price increases affect gasoline, electricity, and postage.

Mar. 27—The Trades Union Congress (representing 9.5 million workers) endorses the budget announced by the Labour government; the government is asking for voluntary wage restraints in the face of inflation. The Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (representing 1.5 million workers), however, announces a ban on overtime work, hoping to win a big wage increase.

Foreign Secretary James Callaghan tells Commons that the government is suspending economic aid to Chile and refusing to sell arms to Chile's military junta.

Northern Ireland

(See also *Ireland*)

Mar. 1—Results of yesterday's election for Britain's Parliament show that hard-line Protestants, who oppose sharing power with the Catholics, have won 11 of Northern Ireland's 12 seats in the British House of Commons.

UNITED STATES

Administration

(See also *U.S., Legislation, Political Scandal, Politics*)

Mar. 14—The White House announces the resignation of Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz.

Mar. 19—Speaking before the National Association of Broadcasters in Houston, President Nixon announces that certain restrictions to conserve energy will be lifted, including the ban on Sunday sales of gasoline.

Mar. 31—In a 2d address in 3 days on the problems of Vietnam War veterans, President Nixon says he is establishing a committee to coordinate federal programs to aid the veteran.

Civil Rights

Mar. 29—One current member and 7 former members of Ohio's National Guard are indicted by a federal grand jury for violating the civil rights of 4 Kent State University students who were killed

and 9 who were wounded during a student demonstration May 4, 1970.

Economy

Mar. 15—The Cost of Living Council lifts price controls on the newspaper, broadcasting, advertising, and other communications industries.

Mar. 20—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. basic balance of international payments showed a surplus of \$1.2 billion in 1973: this is the first surplus since 1960.

Mar. 21—The Labor Department announces a 1.3 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index for the month of February. This is the sharpest monthly rise since last August when the price freeze ended. The price index is 10 percent above the index of February, 1973.

Mar. 27—The Chase Manhattan Bank reveals that its minimum interest rate on corporate loans (the prime lending rate) has been raised to 9¼ percent; on March 22, the prime rate was raised from 8¾ to 9. The Crocker Bank raises its prime rate to 9½ percent.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, EEC, Middle East; U.S., Administration*)

Mar. 8—The State Department announces that a meeting tentatively scheduled for Wednesday with EEC delegates has been cancelled.

Mar. 16—*The New York Times* reports European resentment over President Nixon's criticism of the U.S.'s European allies. In his speech in Chicago yesterday, President Nixon warned that European allies could not expect the U.S. to maintain troops in Europe if Europe did not cooperate with the U.S.

Mar. 17—A Nixon administration official discloses that President Nixon informed the EEC last week that he had cancelled plans to visit European heads of government next month.

Mar. 19—Moderating earlier criticism of Europe, President Nixon states that the U.S. and Europe will work out their differences "in the economic and political field."

An agreement in principle is announced on new payments by West Germany to offset the costs of stationing U.S. troops in Germany; it was negotiated by U.S. Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz and West German Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt.

Mar. 22—The Export-Import Bank announces the resumption of lending to the U.S.S.R., Rumania, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Continued lending is contingent on congressional action. According to a House bill, the lending can be cut off if the U.S.S.R. and other Communist bloc countries do not relax their emigration restrictions.

Mar. 26—An administration spokesman reports that in an official change of policy, Kissinger has indicated to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt that the U.S. is no longer interested in a written redefinition of West German—U.S. relations; the U.S. prefers a series of consultations. U.S. requests for written redefinitions have been the cause of trans-Atlantic tension.

Mar. 27—Kissinger and Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R., end 3 days of discussion in Moscow.

Mar. 28—Kissinger returns to Washington after an unsuccessful attempt to reach a "conceptual breakthrough" leading to Soviet-American agreement on strategic arms limitation.

Mar. 29—The Thai and U.S. governments announce that the U.S. will withdraw about 10,000 Americans from the U.S. force of 35,000 in Thailand in the next few months. A Defense Department spokesman explains that "the situation has stabilized" in the Indochinese area.

Izvestia (the Soviet government newspaper) takes an optimistic view of the Kissinger-Brezhnev talks, noting that "the time and content of the talks far from correspond to the pessimistic mood music" of Western news reports.

Mar. 30—After 2 days of talks with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in Washington, Kissinger tells newsmen that Dayan's proposal of yesterday for the disengagement of Israeli-Syrian forces will provide a "useful basis" for the negotiations with Israel and Syria.

Legislation

Mar. 6—The Senate votes, 72-26, against the 22.5 percent, 3-year pay increase for congressmen, federal judges, and top-level federal officials, as proposed by President Nixon. The House will not have to act on the proposal.

President Nixon vetoes the emergency energy bill, especially because of a price-rollback provision. In an unsuccessful attempt to override the veto, the Senate vote (58-40) falls 8 votes short of the required two-thirds needed to override a veto.

Mar. 8—In a message to Congress, President Nixon proposes political campaign reforms to end corruption and to provide for full disclosure of all private political contributions.

Mar. 28—The Senate votes 71 to 29 and the House votes 345 to 50 to approve legislation that would raise the federal minimum wage for most workers in manufacturing and retail industries to \$2 an hour May 1; the measure goes to the President. According to the new law, the hourly minimum wage will climb to \$2.10 January 1, 1975, and to \$2.30 January 1, 1976. Minimum wages for workers in service industries and for farm workers will

also rise. Federal standards will be extended to domestic servants and to those working for state and local governments. Special provisions are made for full-time students, policemen and firemen. The last minimum wage increase legislation was passed in 1966.

Political Scandal (Watergate)

(See also *U.S., Administration, Legislation, Politics*)

Mar. 1—A federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., indicts 7 men—all former officials of President Richard M. Nixon's administration or of his 1972 re-election campaign—on charges of conspiracy in covering up the Watergate scandal. Those indicted are former Attorney General John N. Mitchell; H. R. Haldeman, former head of the White House staff; John D. Ehrlichman, former assistant to the President for domestic affairs; Charles W. Colson, former presidential special counsel; Robert C. Mardian, former aide to Mitchell in the 1972 campaign; Kenneth W. Parkinson, attorney for the Committee for the Re-election of the President; Gordon C. Strachan, former aide to Haldeman.

In addition to the indictments, the Watergate grand jury asks Chief Judge John J. Sirica of the U.S. district court for the District of Columbia to give the House Judiciary Committee studying the evidence for the possible impeachment of the President a secret report and a briefcase containing evidence relating to President Nixon's alleged role in the Watergate cover-up.

Mar. 6—James D. St. Clair, President Nixon's counsel, says that the President has agreed to turn over to the House Judiciary Committee all the documents and tape recordings that were given to Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski. He says President Nixon will submit to written questions from the House Judiciary Committee and will permit an "interview" by a group from the Judiciary Committee "under oath."

At a televised news conference, President Nixon denies that he ever approved of offering hush money or executive clemency to the Watergate defendants. He discloses that on March 21, 1973, John W. Dean 3d informed him that money was paid to the Watergate defendants to buy their silence, and "not simply for their defense."

Mar. 7—In a letter from St. Clair, the President's special counsel, to the House Judiciary Committee, the President informs the committee that he feels that his offer to furnish all the materials supplied to the Watergate grand jury should "provide the committee with the necessary material to resolve any questions concerning him." The House Judiciary Committee has requested 6 tapes and other items not given to Jaworski.

The second grand jury investigating the Water-

gate scandal hands down indictments charging 6 persons with breaking into the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, in 1971. Among those named are John D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. Colson, former counsel to President Nixon, Felipe de Diego, and 3 of the convicted Watergate burglars—G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Barker, and Eugenio R. Martinez.

Mar. 9—In U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., 7 former associates of President Nixon plead not guilty before Chief Judge John J. Sirica to charges of covering up the burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. Two of the 7, John D. Ehrlichman and Charles W. Colson, also plead not guilty to charges in the 2d grand jury indictment presented on March 7 in Washington, D.C., with regard to the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office.

Mar. 13—At a news conference, the House Judiciary Committee's chairman, Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D., N.J.) announces that all persons are expected to cooperate with the House investigation.

G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez, and Felipe de Diego plead not guilty to charges of conspiring to violate the civil rights of Dr. Lewis Fielding, whose office was burglarized under a scheme arranged by the White House "plumbers."

Mar. 18—Chief Judge Sirica rules that a secret grand jury report and a briefcase of evidence concerning President Nixon's alleged role in the Watergate scandal should be turned over to the House Judiciary Committee. Sirica withholds the effect of his order for 2 days to allow for appeals. Attorneys for 7 former White House aides or officials of the President's re-election campaign, indicted on March 1, announce that they will file appeals.

Mar. 21—In Washington, D.C., the U.S. Court of Appeals refuses to stop the delivery of a secret grand jury report on the President's alleged role in the Watergate scandal to the House Judiciary Committee studying the possible impeachment of the President.

Special Watergate prosecutor Leon Jaworski reveals that he has subpoenaed additional material from the White House files; the subpoena must be answered by March 25.

Mar. 24—Speaking on the television program "Face the Nation," ranking Republican Watergate committee member Senator Howard Baker (Tenn.) says the President should give all "relevant material" to the House Judiciary Committee; he urges the President to make public the tape of his March 21 conversation with former presidential counsel John Dean 3d.

Mar. 25—White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler says that in an arrangement between Ja-

worski and James St. Clair, the deadline for the subpoenaed papers has been extended 4 days.

Mar. 26—The Watergate grand jury's secret report is delivered to the House Judiciary Committee as directed by federal district Judge John J. Sirica.

Mar. 28—In his first interference with a Watergate lawsuit, U.S. Attorney General William B. Saxbe asks the U.S. court of appeals to uphold the President's refusal to surrender 5 tapes to the Senate Watergate committee. Saxbe was not asked by the court to take part in the case.

Mar. 29—White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler informally reveals that the White House has agreed to give Jaworski all the materials he subpoenaed March 15.

Political Terrorism

Mar. 26—People in Need program director Secretary of State of Washington A. Ludlow Kramer announces the end of the \$2-million food distribution program set up to effect the release of Patricia Hearst, kidnapped February 4. It is hoped that the Symbionese Liberation Army will now begin negotiations for Ms. Hearst's release.

Politics

Mar. 5—Thomas A. Luken (D.) wins in a special election in the First Congressional District in Ohio over his Republican candidate. The district has elected Democrats only 3 times in the 20th century.

Mar. 19—At a news conference, Senator James L. Buckley (Conservative-Republican, N.Y.) urges President Nixon's "voluntary resignation."

Mar. 28—Common Cause publishes a report revealing that more than \$14 million in cash has already been collected for House and Senate 1974 campaigns; the largest single cash deposit set aside for the campaign is \$1.4 million, held by the political arm of the Associated Milk Producers.

Supreme Court

Mar. 4—Voting 8 to 1, the Supreme Court rules that a conscientious objector who chooses alternate service as a civilian over military duty is not eligible for veterans' educational benefits.

VENEZUELA

Mar. 12—Carlos Andrés Pérez is inaugurated as President.


VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Mar. 22—The Vietcong issue a 6-point plan calling for a new cease-fire and general elections.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See *Egypt*)



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